WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN TERRORISM

The Emerging Threat Posed by Non-State Proliferation

by

James K. Campbell

Commander, U.S. Navy

27 October 1996

To date most informed opinions on non-state political violence suggest that terrorist of the future will neither seek to develop, nor threaten to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Arguments supporting this position are typically presented through a framework of anachronistic assumptions that have been in use since the days of the late nineteenth century Russian Nihilist movement.

These assumptions suggest that first, the terrorist groups are nothing more than a collection of frustrated, political actors bent on correcting a perceived flaw in the socio-political order of the state. The cause to take up terrorism evolves adjunct to their failure or inability to influence objectional political, economic and/or social conditions that define their environment. Second, it is assumed that these frustrated actors adopt terrorism as a means to press their political agenda through the use of directed and modulated violence. This violence is designed to communicate a complex message that primarily gains the terrorist group public recognition for their cause. Unmitigated destruction and violence is not the goal as noted by Brian Jenkins who suggests that "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead."

A third assumption suggests that terrorists are "mirror imaging rational actors," e.g., their behavior is normative. As such they are subsumed to understand that exceeding a certain violence threshold may result in a globally enjoined effort to eradicate them.

Finally it is assumed that the technology and associated costs involved in the development and production of weapons of mass destruction are beyond the reach of the non- state group. For these reasons the image of the classical terrorist of the twentieth century has not included WMD. However, these traditional arguments have arguably weakened due to the changing nature of the terrorist phenomenon. Specifically these changes are emerging in areas related to supply and demand variables, variables that certainly influence a non-state group's decision to develop and use WMD.

Supply issues suggest that first, the availability of materials and technical requirements to produce "lo-tech" WMD are well within the reach of contemporary non-state groups; second, that many groups have the financial capacity to fund such programs; and third, that individuals knowledgeable of WMD technologies are involved with groups that might threaten the use of WMD.

Demand issues suggest that ownership and use of WMD by a non-state group provides a powerful negotiating tool, status, and power. Thomas Schelling notes that a terrorist organization which achieves a WMD capability ascends to a higher position of relative power and prestige. Of note, the absence of territorial boundaries in the case of the non-state group serves to make state retaliation difficult as the terrorist become hard to target, a problem that Marrs suggests serves to "vitiate the retaliatory threats of the state."

Third, non-state groups that embrace religious ideologies affiliated with apocalyptic millennialism, redemptive religious fanaticism or racist/ethnic hate may not operate according to traditional terrorist logic. In many of these groups, egregious acts of an extremely violent nature are viewed as either sanctioned or demanded by God. Where traditional terrorists typically operate within certain violence thresholds, those operating under the interpreted direction of the Almighty are arguably not subject to the same constraints. Non-state groups operating under the "cloak of religion" might very well be the most likely candidates to use the unlimited or disproportionate violence WMD affords.

The "Post-Modern Terrorist" or "The Revolution in Terrorist Affairs"

Much as scientific, technological, and social changes continually influence the manner and mediums by which artists express themselves, so to have these things influenced the behavior and enhanced the capabilities of the terrorist. The attenuation of traditional means to ends in recent terrorist acts is evident in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103; the 1993 World Trade Center complex bombing; the 1995 Oklahoma Federal Building bombing and Tokyo nerve gas attack; the 1996 Hamas bombings in Israel, IRA bombings in London, the Islamic radical bombings in Saudi Arabia, the bombing of a pavilion at the Atlanta Olympics, and what appears to be the work of terrorists in the downing of TWA flight 800. These ultra-violent acts suggest the days of constrained violence are diminishing. New twists on old ideological imperatives coupled with the availability of more lethal weapons and weapon related technologies are rapidly enabling the terrorist to cause maximum death and destruction.

Of increasing occurrence is the ultra-violent terrorist act followed by silence. Many times in recent years terrorist acts have been committed without a group "stepping forward" to claim credit for the event. Events such as the downing of Pan Am flight 103, the Air India flight that crashed off of the Irish coast in 1988, the recent terrorist bombing at the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, all suggest a "shift" in terms of the message the terrorist act is supposed to send. Where traditional terrorists use the event to gain access to a "bully-pulpit" to air their grievances, these "silent terrorist" send a silent message creating a superordinary sense of overwhelming fear, and vulnerability.

By not claiming responsibility for the event, non-state (or state supported) groups may actually be able to do more damage to the selected target. The fact that no one group has stepped forward to claim responsibility for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing has, at a minimum, caused difficulties between the U.S. and her economic allies, heightening tensions between the Islamic countries of Libya, Iran, Sudan and Syria vis-a-vis the U.S. This could represent part of a new non-state strategy to polarize the Islamic community against the West, while at the same time causing a divisiveness between Western allies.

This change in the characterization of terrorism may be indicative of a new era, one in which the traditional, "constrained," terrorist of the twentieth century is supplanted by the ultra- violent "post-modern terrorist" of the twenty-first century who uses advanced technology, and anonymity, to conduct destructive acts traditionally viewed as disproportionate to desired ends.

Genesis of the "Post Modern Terrorist"

Expanding on a general theme discussed recently by Walter Laqueur, the emergence of the "post-modern terrorist" appears to have two causes. One may be religious revivalism. Religion has played a part in legitimizing extremes of violence throughout history, tendencies that are generally constrained in traditionally (secular-political) oriented, non-state groups. Ultra- violent terrorist acts rooted in religious imperatives can be seen in Sri Lanka, where Tamil Hindus are waging a bloody terrorist campaign against the Sinhalese Buddhists; in India and Pakistan where Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslim extremist groups engage in violent struggles; in Israel, where both radical Palestinian and Israeli movements have caused great injury and death in the name of God. The success of Khomeini's 1979 Islamic Revolution has also been viewed as enhancing the level of violence in terrorist activities perpetrated by radical Islamists world- wide.

The second cause is arguably related to the removal of constraints imposed by the Cold War, and the subsequent disintegration of a bipolar world order. As a result of this disintegration, a new world disorder seems to have emerged in which the legitimacy of many states is being challenged from within by increasing non-state calls for self-determination. Huntington affirms this trend in a recent essay in which he suggests that the causes of future conflict will be rooted in a clash of cultures. He argues that ethnic and religious movements will supplant traditional political ideologies with cultural ones. Where these movements cross each other, bloody conflict will erupt.

Prime examples of this phenomenon can already be seen in Algeria, Somalia, Egypt, Sudan, Rwanda, Chechnya, the Balkans, Indonesia - and even here in the United States. These movements often prey on the insecurities of the population, offering to fill the psychological, sociological, political or religious security needs of those who would join them. Examples of such groups have emerged in the form of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo; the Identity movement in the U.S.; and the radical Islamic revivalist movements that exist in a variety of countries.

These religiously oriented groups appear to share a common ideological thread that rejects existing societal structures and demand a structural revision of the world in a manner that will ensure their own dominance. To this end, the threat or actual use of WMD may be the method by which they believe they can paralyze the state without having to expose themselves. Capitalizing on the highly cultivated fear WMD use engenders could permit the non-state group to "snatch" a piece of power from the state as it tries to respond to the crises, and manage the consequence of the threatened attack. Thus, armed with WMD, the non-state group is enabled to press home an agenda without having to engage in protracted social movements or insurgency.

Conclusion

WMD use can cause mass casualties and substantial infrastructure disruption, far more than that caused by any previous terrorist incident. Since the threat to use WMD affords the non- state group a powerful tool that heretofore has not been available to them, non-state proliferation presents a security dilemma that the global community must actively attempt to resolve.

Recognizing the WMD threat in general terms, President Clinton signed Executive Order No. 12938 on November 14, 1994. This order declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose to the national security, foreign interest, and economy of the United States. On November 9, 1995, a continuation of this order was declared by Executive notice. This declared state of a national emergency has continued. Despite the existence of a robust, widely supported international regime to control the spread of WMD, the consensus of various scholars and policy makers, identifies WMD proliferation as the top security threat our Nation faces today. Senator Sam Nunn's address concerning proliferation echoes these sentiments:

The number one security challenge in the United States now and probably for years ahead is to prevent these weapons of mass destruction, whether chemical, biological or nuclear, and the scientific knowledge of how to make them, from going all over the world to rogue groups, to terrorist groups, to rogue nations.

Raising the specter of this concern, in March of 1995, members of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo released nerve gas in a Tokyo subway, resulting in the death of 12 people and the injury of 5000. Following this horrendous act, Congressional hearings on the potential for continued non-state group employment of WMD concluded with the assertion that non-state proliferation poses a difficult challenge to our National security primarily because these groups are exceptionally hard to target, and much harder to deter, more so than say an identifiable rogue state.

It is intimately clear that when a non-state group such as Aum is able to develop a WMD capability, an endemic failure within the international community exists that must certainly be remedied. That failure relates to two significant deficiencies. First, our collective, intelligence capabilities to identify such groups early on needs to be improved. As discussed in Congressional hearings held in November of 1995, the threat posed by Aum was never even on our intelligence "radar screens." If we are going to beat these "bad guys," we must fine tune our intelligence apparatus so that we may identify these groups, their capabilities and intentions. By doing this we assure ourselves the ability to operate inside the terrorist group's "decision making loop." Operating inside this "loop" will allow us to preempt the terrorist action before it occurs. Second, export controls and domestic efforts to restrict the sale of chemical/biological precursors, dual use technology and equipment must be strengthened.

Aum has proven that a determined non-state group can amass material, know-how, and equipment to develop and threaten the use of WMD. The concern now lies in discerning what the next group will do having learned from Aum's mistakes. A robust effort to improve our knowledge of terrorist groups through human and open source intelligence gathering, coupled with strengthened efforts to control access to chemical and biological agents, their precursors and duel use equipment, will certainly help to minimize the WMD threat posed by these "post-modern-terrorists."