Strategic Knowledge; Preventing
the Bombing of
the Bridge to the 21st Century
By: C. L. Staten, CEO/CIO
Emergency Response & Research Institute
Chicago, IL, April 9, 1997 (ERRI) -- The nature and the face of
intelligence, military, and emergency service operations are all
going to change as we move rapidly into the 21st Century. The
nature of the world's economic, military, technological, and
geo-political structures are evolving at a more rapid rate than
ever before. In order to be better understand our current
circumstances and to effectively prepare for future
eventualities, the following issues are presented for
consideration.
Nature of
the Problem; Paralysis of Analysis-A glut of information for
decision-makers
The basic problem involves the fact that many current U.S.
government systems are just too slow to respond to a rapidly
evolving world environment. Information and decisions must pass
through many "channels" and specialist
"cubbyholes" (as described by Toffler, et al), each
with their own priorities and bits of the total picture. The
overall system then hopes that all of these "bits and
bytes" will get put back together into a comprehensive
picture higher in the chain of command. Some experts today
question even this basic premise.
This compartmentalization of information seemingly prevents it
from arriving in the hands of the people who need it to manage a
strategic or tactical situation....in any sort of a timely
manner. It must travel up the information chain, being
"filtered" and "massaged" by any number of
analysts, managers, and political operatives. Then, it must
travel back down a chain of command and control, again being
"manipulated" as it travels the avenues of the
"action info-highway."
"The system" hasn't evolved much as overall information
management capabilities have advanced and grown. Pertinent
information needs to flow more rapidly down to the
"manager" at the scene of the incident; be it a
disaster or major military confrontation (and those two may
become intertwined as time goes on). Vital information is of
little use until it is applied to the problems that actually
exist on the ground. Our "information system" should
allows leaders to anticipate, plan, obtain logistics, and
effectively implement sound tactics and strategies....in a rapid
and more effective manner.
Intelligence
Agencies:
Current security classifications and numerous levels of access
may actually prohibit our leadership from gaining a real
understanding of the world situation. The current classification
systems often leads to information being "cubby-holed"
by operatives or analysts who have reason to believe that it's
disclosure could prove damaging to our country. This arrangement
generally inhibits real-time analysis, due to the fact that there
are too many "small pictures," and not enough large
ones.
It would appear that the intelligence agencies may be undergoing
an identity crisis following the cold war, the re-tasking of
threats, and the recent spy scandals that have rocked several
agencies. Like IBM, General Motors, and other industrial
behemoths, it is our hypothesis that the CIA, DIA, NRO, others
need to re-engineer their operations to be able to instantly
respond to "micro-crisis" situations. The necessity of
early warning and intervention has been shown time and again in
"real world" scenarios.
It would appear that too much data is being compartmentalized and
not enough shared among military and other government agencies,
due to questions about security classification and
"need-to-know." Open source intelligence might be a
better alternative, as it is easier and faster...but, analysis is
much tougher due to the massive amounts of data that is
available; some of it of questionable quality. It has, however,
been demonstrated that open source collection and analysis can be
done more rapidly than the existing system and that it may be
more appropriate when brought to bear on commercial and
industrial interests. American and her leadership might be best
served by a synthesis of both wide-spread open source collection
and analysis and a continuation of the necessary covert and
classified traditional methods.
Big problems also currently exist with information being filtered
by "info-tacticians" from both sides
(internally/politically and externally from our
"enemies") Current trends would suggest that we should
expect an increasing number of and greater sophistication in
propaganda and misinformation campaigns...particularly as they
relate to geo-political/ideological issues. One of the biggest
problems in the future will be to ascertain the validity of an
increasing number of facts that could inundate any information
gathering system.
It would also appear that greater emphasis must be given to
HUMINT (human intelligence gathering) networks. Agents in place
are needed in many countries. Our intelligence gathering assets
in a number of countries have diminished as political alliances
have changed and a greater reliance on technology has been
implemented in some agencies. Satellites are a tremendous
resource and may tell us something or somebody moved, but won't
tell us why or what they intend to do next; that requires
knowledgeable and courageous people "on the ground."
Military:
"Total situation awareness", down to the individual
soldier level, continues to be more a goal, than a viable
reality. Those that study such issues are discovering that you
can't just bolt a video screen into a helmet, vehicle or command
post and hope for "awareness" by the commanders or
troops on the ground. The issue is far more complex than that and
involves both physical and psychological implications. There
would appear to be much work to be done in regard to improving
the flow of data to and from the scene of a crisis or
confrontation.
It is important to know that information or knowledge superiority
may win wars, but that this advantage can be fleeting and fragile
at best. Even small "inputs" can cause disproportionate
effects; one piece of information can provide a tremendous
strategic or tactical advantage, or the denial thereof can also
result in catastrophic defeat.
The concept of "information dominance" and creating a
"technology umbrella" to protect America and her allies
would appear to be both admirable and feasible, if an appropriate
amount of brain power and economic resources are committed to the
effort. Such a change will require more thinking "outside
the box" of conventional military and political philosophy
and result in a paradigm shift in the direction of our country's
defense and national security establishment. (Please see paradigm
shifts below)
A troubling paradox, however, involves the fact that as we become
"information dependent" for our military success, we
also become information vulnerable as our infrastructure and
equipment becomes more inter-connected and complex. As evidenced
by several recent revelations in the popular media, the
civilian/commercial side of our "info-infrastructure"
is becoming interdependent with the military side of this
equation, with both becoming increasingly vulnerable. Greater
steps must be undertaken to assure the security of all of the
parts of our country's technology assets.
Troubling questions about force-projection, force-protection,
conventional vrs. low-intensity warfare, and other related issues
will continue and probably increase in the coming decade. The
concept of maintaining sufficient forces and structure to engage
in two Major Regional Conflicts (MRC's) concurrently, will
continue to be debated in both political, budgetary, and military
circles.
Some critics of the "2-MRC concept" would suggests that
the United States needs to be more prepared to fight numerous
"brushfire" conflicts or engage in
"peace-keeping" operations, rather than fight major
confrontations in the coming decade. Some experts would even go
so far to suggest that further force reductions are possible by
planning to fight only one major conflict at a time, thus
resulting in budgetary savings. ERRI would suggest that a further
"draw-down" of manpower is probably not warranted at
this time, but that greater flexibility is necessary in force
tasking and that a greater use of computer-generated
"strike/defense package" configurations might be
beneficial. Additional computerization of support and logistics
functions could also prove beneficial.
If lessons learned in Haiti and Somalia are indicative, violence
levels will continue to increase in any number of developing
countries and effective law enforcement measures will need to be
taken by the international community. These operations will
frequently involve military/paramilitary action. Increasing
numbers of peace keeping operations will probably also require
greater anti/counter-terrorist capabilities and resources. Care,
control, and policing of civilian populations could become an
inherent and increasing problem in "peace-keeping" and
"nation-building" operations. Additional training,
consistent with these new missions should be provided to American
troops, and greater use of larger numbers of special operations
forces may also be anticipated.
Terrorism:
As the concept of "stateless warfare" continues to
emerge, and its implications better understood, it would appear
the greater the need for closer cooperation between emergency
service and military agencies. Greater collaboration between
Fire/Police/EMS and Military agencies may become mandatory in
domestic terrorism circumstances. Over-lapping and concurrent
responsibilities could become apparent...as multiple terrorist
acts could cause interdependency in civilian/military chains of
command. Certainly, at a bare minimum, direct interaction and
communications between these vital civilian and military agencies
must take place.
Terrorist events currently move faster than responses...leading
to decision-makers being forced into uneducated
"guesses" about what to do next. Information may not
only be slow, but also irrelevant to those that need it to make
decisions. The real requirement is to acquire and analyze
pertinent data, in as close to real-time as possible, to speed
the decision-making loop.
Current operational trends in stateless warfare may require that
we track individual terrorists...particularly those with
specialized capabilities like explosives, assassinations, etc.
Greater computer capability and increasing cooperation between
nations can make this possible. Some have suggested that this
same information could be used for air travel profiling
databases, which could target terrorists, rather than just trying
to track the general public.
Global communications strategies are changing, and even small
terrorist groups are now using the internet to broadcast their
message and misdirect/misinform the general population in
multiple nations simultaneously. Additionally, it would also
appear that drug and terrorist operations are being planned and
implemented through the use of internet, satellite
communications, and encrypted messages. Military and law
enforcement agencies must be trained and equipped to counter
increasing more sophisticated adversaries.
Good intelligence gathering, infiltration, predictive analysis
and preemptive action are probably the best defenses against
terrorism. The the best possible outcome of any terrorist
event...is preventing an incident before it occurs. These
necessary measures may include additional changes in current
federal regulations, but lawmakers should be cautioned to avoid
unnecessary intrusions into the private lives of U.S. citizens,
or any action that could be construed as diminishing the
individual freedoms of Americans. To do so will only play into
the hands of enemies of the United States.
Paradigm
Shift?
The basic rhetorical question is; are the military and
intelligence communities undergoing a "paradigm shift"?
Are advances in computer technology and information
gathering/dissemination going to dramatically change the way that
we conduct foreign policy and military operations? The answers
would currently appear to be encouraging, complex and
confusing...all at the present time.
There are certainly drastic differences between America, it's
"info-structure," and the capabilities of developing
nations. Due to the capital-intensive nature of the development
of these advanced technologies, many smaller countries will not
be able to move forward to an information-based economy, nor to
an information-based defense establishment.
As America undertakes this paradigm we must be mindful of the
fact that we must retain the capability to defend against
low-tech threats as well as those from the technologically
sophisticated. The range of differing kinds of threats has
broadened dramatically in the past two decades. While the threat
of nuclear holocaust has probably decreased to the lowest levels
since the 1950's, the likelihood of chemical/ biological/nuclear
terrorism, possibly committed by a small number of individuals,
has become a frightening possibility.
Conclusion:
A comprehensive knowledge strategy must combine acquisition,
processing, distribution, and protection of information, all in
an interrelated and interdependent manner. It must be comprised
of a rapid, effective gathering and processing of data that can
be formulated into knowledge that is actually usable by decision
makers. Intelligence and counter-intelligence operations and
analysis must occur simultaneously.
Strategic knowledge must go beyond electronic warfare (jamming,
commo intercept, etc), beyond command and control - C4 warfare
(Jstars, situational awareness, etc.), beyond information warfare
(propaganda, psy-ops, info-structure attacks), to a full-blown
global knowledge attainment that involves all facets of our
society. It is believed that it is an integration of both
civilian and military resources and abilities that will provide
for the greatest defense and the advancement of both the United
States and mankind in general.
(C) The Emergency Response & Research Institute, 1997. All
rights reserved. May be reproduced with permission.
This discussion paper was prepared by
the Emergency Response & Research Institute of Chicago, IL.
It was developed to prompt thought and discussion of military,
intelligence, and national security issues that will have a
profound impact on the United States in the coming decade.
Questions, comments, suggestions, and criticism are welcomed, and
may be addressed to enn@emergency.com.
[Note: Appeared in Journal of Counter-Terrorism & Security International, Vol. 6, No. 2., Pg. 10-12, January, 2000. Electronic copyright retained by the Emergency Response & Research Institute, Inc.]