From: ERRI DAILY INTELLIGENCE
REPORT-ERRI Risk Assessment Services-Saturday, August 30,
1997-Vol. 3 - 242
THE GLOBAL ODD COUPLE ...
By Steve Macko, ERRI Risk Analyst
Ever since they first joined forces 50 years ago, there has been
a special relationship between the United States and Saudi
Arabia. At the top of any list of interesting alliances, the U.S.
and the Saudi kingdom are right there.
For the two countries to be allies -- they are indeed the global
Oscar and Felix. The U.S. is dynamic and democratic. The Saudi
kingdom is traditional and feudal. The U.S. is open, the Saudis
are closed and repressive. The United States embraces diversity,
Saudi Arabia hides half of its population in veiled anonymity
(women).
But there is one single shared interest that binds to two
nations. The United States needs to buy oil and the Saudis need
to sell it. This "marriage" of convenience in proving,
in some ways, to be inconvenient. Irritations and disagreements
are said to trouble the military partnership. Two terrorist
bombings have announced a grassroots Saudi opposition to
Americans.
Currently, about 20,000 U.S. service personnel are on duty in
Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region. They are
there to keep an eye on Iraq, Iran and the Industrialized world's
oil supply. There are about 80 U.S. Air Force warplanes that are
ready to defend the kingdom. They fly continuous patrols over
southern Iraq. In the waters of the Gulf, there are upwards to 35
U.S. Navy warships on patrol, mostly keeping a close eye on
Iranian intentions. Elsewhere in the Gulf region, military
equipment is/has been prepositioned for thousands of U.S. Army
soldiers who would be flown in during a crisis. The U.S. military
commitment to the Gulf region has grown larger as America's
dependence on imported oil grew through the 1990s.
Analysts estimate that the Persian Gulf military commitment costs
U.S. taxpayers at least $40 billion a year. To some in
Washington, that cost looks excessive.
Joseph Romm, the conservation chief of the U.S. Energy
Department, said, "How do we want to deal with our energy
problems? By having a war every several years? Clearly you need
to have an approach that reduces American dependence on foreign
oil."
There are other concerns that seem to be more immediate, such as
local hostility toward U.S. troops are inflaming the opposition
to the Saudi monarchy. What was once seen as a security solution
to external threats -- the shield of the U.S. military -- is now
being seen as becoming part of an internal security problem.
Saudi officials though sound reassuring. Royal advisor Abdel-Aziz
Al-Fayez said, "I don't think there's a strong resentment of
the Americans. They're not a colonial force." But he added,
"Not everybody has the same feeling."
Ever since the two terrorist bombings that killed a total of 24
U.S. service personnel in November of 1995 and June of 1996, the
U.S. profile in the kingdom has been lowered. U.S. military
forces are now consolidated in two locations: a high-security
compound just outside of Riyadh and the Prince Sultan Air Base,
located 80 miles south of the capital.
The few service personnel allowed to travel off-base must follow
strict security rules. But there are other tensions. The Air
Force must disguise chapels as "morale centers" because
other religions are outlawed in Saudi Arabia.
Other hadicaps include:
-- The Saudis will not allow U.S. Navy ships to make port visits.
-- An American proposal to stockpile U.S. Equipment on Saudi soil
for a "crisis brigade" has been refused.
-- The Saudis refused to allow U.S. Air Force planes to hit Iraqi
targets in September of 1996 during reprisal strikes against
Saddam Hussein and his little excursion into northern Iraq.
-- Ever since bankrolling the 1991 Gulf War, the Saudis have
refused to contribute to U.S. operations, such as the large 1994
deployment of U.S. troops in Kuwait.
Although the Saudis have declined to fund operations, the
Pentagon is quick to point out that the kingdom has purchased
about $62 billion in U.S. military arms between 1990 and 1995.
But even though Saudi Arabia is one of the U.S. defense
industry's biggest customers, the kingdom has a serious
shortcoming -- it has too many ultramodern warships that stay in
port and too many missiles still in the boxes because the Saudi
military ranks are undermanned and undertrained.
One U.S. admiral said, "Their ranks are too thin. After a
week's operation, they're tired."
After the 1991 Gulf War, the Saudis said that they would double
the size of their armed forces to 200,000 men by 1998. Military
analysts estimated Saudi military strength in 1996 to be at
105,000. Saudi defense spending has been reduced by nine percent.
Analysts believe that the kingdom faces a dilemma: They know that
the U.S.military presence is provocative to their people, but
they need it to counter external threats. And they don't really
want to build a strong military because it might threaten Saud
family rule.
And so, the Oscar and Felix of the world continue to dig in --
side by side, but not to close -- out in the vast Arabian desert.
And what will happen when Saddam Hussein meets his just reward by
the way of a bullet, bomb or plane crash? Will the U.S. military
leave? Said one Gulf specialist, "As long as there is oil in
Saudi Arabia, the Americans will be there."
(c) Copyright, EmergencyNet NEWS Service, 1997. All Rights
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