ENN Peru Hostage Incident Reports; Assault Successful

ENN DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT-Tuesday, April 22, 1997, Vol. 3 - No. 112, 08:42:12a.m.

FUJIMORI-CERPA, A TEST OF WILLS

By Steve Macko, ERRI Analyst

LIMA (ENN) - Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori is described as the iron man in Peruvian politics. But in the match of wills between Fujimori and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) leader Nestor Cerpa -- Fujimori may have met his match.

Peruvian psychologists are said to describe both men as stubborn, patient, egotistical and manipulative. In this battle of wills to determine the fate of 72 hostages that are still being held in the residence of the Japanese ambassador, neither Cerpa or Fujimori has blinked. And the copy of a recent psychological profile of Cerpa is said not to bode well for a peaceful end to the hostage crisis that is now into its fifth month.

In a confidential psychological profile that was dated 21 February, police psychologists said, "Cerpa will be a difficult person to negotiate with while he feels in control, but he would be totally unpredictable if he is ever put in a position of weakness."

Cerpa is still demanding the release of jailed MRTA comrades in exchange for the hostages. Negotiations between the terrorists and the Peruvian government have been stalled since 12 March.

Doctor Cesar Rodriguez, a prominent Peruvian psychologist said, "Fujimori has a very rigid and authoritarian character and in that way he and Cerpa are extremely similar. Neither man wants to blink first." The doctor added, "Cerpa feels he is more experienced and more prepared than Fujimori and that he has absolutely nothing to lose."

Raul Gonzalez, an expert on Peruvian guerrilla groups and who has written extensively about them, says, "He (Cerpa) knew how to get in, but he doesn't know how to get out. He doesn't know how to negotiate at the political level."

The police psychologists say that Cerpa is very aware of his place in history and is determined to come away from this situation as a hero -- preferably a live hero. But is willing to become a martyr for the cause should that become necessary. The police profile said of Cerpa: "He is not a person to take a step back for fear of losing ground. He's prepared to die for his beliefs."

With negotiations stalled and no hostages being released for quite some time now -- ERRI counterterrorism analysts say that the ingredients for an assault on the residence are there. It's only a matter of the Japanese government giving the Peruvian government the green light to go ahead. The Peruvian authorities are most likely chomping at the bit to launch an assault, but the residence, technically, is Japanese soil and it is not certain if Japanese officials have the will to give approval to an assault which would be, at best, considered highly risky under the current circumstances.

04/22/97 - 15:56:48p.m. - Alert Message to ENN

The government of Peru has stormed the Japanese Ambassador's residence and say all hostages are released. The soldiers used guns and small bombs to storm the residence. Some hostages and MRTA have been hurt. Fujimori is currently on the scene. - A. Mogliner, ENN Correspondent at Large

Hostage Crisis Ended in Lima, Peru

By LYNN MONAHAN

LIMA, (AP) - In a violent end to a four-month hostage crisis, Peruvian forces stormed the Japanese ambassador's mansion Tuesday, freeing dozens of captives of the Tupac Amaru guerrillas. Freed hostages hugged and kissed one another and Peruvian forces jubilantly pulled down the Tupac Amaru flag. Local radio reported the 150-man military strike team rescued all the hostages. It was not clear how many were injured or what their condition was.

From ENN DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT- Wednesday, April 23, 1997 Vol. 3, No. 113

LIMA (ENN) - The hostage crisis of 126 days came to an abrupt end when Peruvian soldiers stormed the Japanese ambassador's residence in exploding gunfire. In less than 30 minutes, the soldiers rescued 71 hostages. One hostage and two soldiers died in the assault, as did all 14 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) terrorists, including their leader Nestor Cerpa. The hostage who died of a heart attack was Peruvian Supreme Court Justice Carlos Giusti.

PERU HOSTAGE CRISIS COMES TO A VIOLENT END ...

By Steve Macko, ERRI Analyst

LIMA (ENN) - Six hours before Peruvian commandos stormed the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Lima on Tuesday, the Chicago-based Emergency Response and Research Institute issued the following information in a report on the crisis:

"With negotiations stalled and no hostages being released for quite some time now -- ERRI counterterrorism analysts say that the ingredients for an assault on the residence are there. It's only a matter of the Japanese government giving the Peruvian government the green light to go ahead. The Peruvian authorities are most likely chomping at the bit to launch an assault, but the residence, technically, is Japanese soil and it is not certain if Japanese officials have the will to give approval to an assault which would be, at best, considered highly risky under the current circumstances."

The Peruvian commandos at 3:23 p.m. in the afternoon launched an assault that freed all but one of the 72 hostages as their terrorist captors were caught off guard while playing soccer. One hostage -- a Peruvian Supreme Court judge -- two soldiers and all 14 terrorists died in the fierce battle that ended the siege.

At least 140 army and navy commandos took part in the assault. They were seen swarming into the compound over walls, while others burst into the building from tunnels.

Killed in the quick operation was Peruvian Judge Carlos Giusti Acuna and two commandos, one said to be the bodyguard of President Alberto Fujimori's son. Within minutes of the beginning of the assault, soldiers began to bring out the hostages. Most looked dazed, but happy and some were barely clothed.

Police sources reported that the key to the success of the assault that ended the longest hostage siege in Latin American history was timing the assault to coincide with the terrorists' regular six-a-side soccer game inside the building. ENN sources said that Peruvian authorities were very aware of the daily routines of the hostages because listening devices had been planted in the building.

Bolivian Ambassador Jorge Gumucio said, "The operation began with the blasting of the floor where they were playing football and immediately through other additional tunnels the special troops came in." The ambassador added that the hostages knew of the attack ten minutes before it occurred, but would not say how they knew.

Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori said that after receiving information about what was going on inside of the building "I did not doubt for one single second in giving the order for this operation." He would not say on what information had prompted the decision, but ENN sources said the green light was given because one of the hostages was deemed to be very ill and all efforts to negotiate his release were refused by the terrorists. It was felt that this hostage would die if nothing was done. What it really did was to give Fujimori a reason of some sort to give the order to attack.

After the successful operation, Fujimori using a bullhorn told the troops who took part in the assault: "In Peru we will not accept terrorism. We have given an example to the international community, which should not allow terrorist blackmail."

Where ERRI analysts were incorrect in their prediction of an upcoming assault is that it was assumed that Peru would ask Japan for approval to launch an assault, but Fujimori never did consult with Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto beforehand because, Fujimori said, he could not afford to lose time. He said, "The surprise factor was fundamental."

Injured in the assault were 25 hostages. Peruvian Foreign Minister Francisco Tudela was shot in the ankle and Supreme Court Judge Luis Serpa Segura reportedly sustained a gunshot wound to the colon. MRTA leader Nestor Cerpa and his 13 cohorts, including two teenage girls, were killed. Cerpa was reportedly one of those who was playing soccer when the assault began.

The 72 hostages were mostly Peruvians, but also included 24 Japanese -- 12 diplomats and 12 businessmen.

In Hamburg, Germany, MRTA spokesman Isaac Velazco said that terrorists would retaliate to the assault by attacking military and economic targets in Peru. Police and armed forces said that security had been increased throughout Lima and rest of the country.

Counterterrorism analysts say that the MRTA's hostage-taking was its last attempt to resuscitate a dying movement, estimated to now have less than 200 members. The movement will now have to reorientate its leadership and probably now concentrate its activity in the central jungle regions of Peru.

Praise for the assault came from abroad. In Washington, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen at the Pentagon said, "We commend them for the way they conducted it and we commend them for the patience they exhibited throughout this ordeal. Cohen said that the U.S. government not informed of the operation beforehand. However, ENN sources said U.S. intelligence assets in Lima knew a couple of hours before that something was going on, they just were not sure as to what.

ERRI analysts tried to piece together how the operation went down. It was a hot afternoon in Lima. Word was passed to the hostages that the attack would occur in ten minutes. The captives were told to drop to the floor when they heard an explosion.

Bolivian Ambassador Gumucio said that the soldiers set an explosion in a tunnel under a hallway of the residence, killing or injuring eight of the terrorists initially, including Cerpa.

Commandos were seen at just before 3:30 p.m. running along the tree-lined streets surrounding the Japanese compound. Shooting began. A small team of special forces stormed through the double doors of the compound's outside wall. The shooting increased at the front of the building.

Two teams of commandos, each with 12 men, attacked the front and rear of the building. A loud explosion rocked the front of the house. The soldiers had blown open the front door and burst inside, guns blazing. Another explosion occurred on the right side of the building and then another from the rear. Soldiers attacked from the rear.

Within seconds, hostages began climbing out windows and down ladders. Inside of the building, gunfire could be heard. Soldiers had ordered the hostages to drop to the floor to avoid being shot. More explosions shook the building. Hostages began appearing on the roof. On hands and knees, they crawled along the flat roof to a side stairway where more soldiers escorted them to freedom.

Compared to the clinical military operation that was taking place in the Japanese compound, the scene in nearby streets was called chaotic. At one intersection about a block and a half from the the residence, police officers and army troops nearly came to blows as the entrance of dozens of ambulances was blocked.

Two hours later, at Peru's emergency military command center, a celebration broke out. One policeman said, "We always knew that we could do it. We've been preparing for this for a long time."

British security forces, including the SAS, reportedly played a role in bringing the siege to an end. A team of Scotland Yard negotiating experts and SAS operators had been on stand-by during the ordeal. The police officers, hostage crisis experts, did advise the Japanese government during the siege.

A small team of six SAS counterterrorism experts flew to Peru shortly before Christmas as part of a British advisory team. British sources on Tuesday night said the British presence had been scaled back to just two hostage negotiators from Scotland Yard. Other British personnel had left the country some weeks ago.

The British Foreign Office said, "We provided a small team of advisors from the Metropolitan Police who have experience in negotiating strategy." Their job was to advise the British ambassador and Peruvian authorities.

ENN sources said that Israeli counterterrorism experts were also believed involved in the planning of the operation and that U.S. special forces personnel took part in the training of the Peruvian commandos.

In the end result, this assault was highly successful because outstanding planning and intelligence gathering measures were undertaken prior to the initiation of the final operation.

From ENN DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT-Thursday, April 24, 1997 Vol. 3, No. 114

BLUEPRINT OF A BRILLIANT RAID ...

By Steve Macko, ERRI Analyst

Just how did Peru's security forces pull off a raid that rivaled some of the most stunning hostage rescues in years? They reportedly did with patience, excellent intelligence, detailed planning and even a bold warning to the hostages just before the assault took place.

Peruvian authorities said that retired naval officer Admiral Luis Giampietri Rojas, who had been able to hide a radio receiver from the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) terrorists for the entire four months of his captivity, received the message: "We'll free you in three minutes." There have been other reports that say the admiral was informed by the use of a pager that he had. The former naval officer quickly passed the word to his fellow hostages.

At 3:17 p.m., Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori gave the order to attack. Six minutes later, the order was carried out by elite Peruvian troops who had hid for a day in tunnels and adjacent houses before launching the assault.

Some counterterrorism experts said that this warning to hostages was risky because, in most cases of this length, it is uncertain if any of the hostages may be afflicted with the infamous "Stockholm Syndrome" and may have tipped off the terrorists. But again, it was either the Peruvians took a chance or, most likely, they had excellent intelligence of the situation inside and knew that they could give a vital warning to the hostages to prepare for the violence that was about to occur.

Outside the residence of the Japanese ambassador, observers could tell the something was about to happen. Witnesses told of a lot of troop movement around the compound, more than usual.

The terrorists, many of them nothing more than teenagers, had become complacent and careless -- and that's what cost them their lives. Even terrorist leader Nestor Cerpa had become careless. After months of being cooped up inside the house, the terrorists, along with Cerpa and his top three lieutenants had been playing soccer with a makeshift ball made out of rolled- up, taped curtain. The four-on-four game had been taking place for twenty minutes when the floor literally exploded beneath their feet.

Over the months, police had dug under the building and had been closely monitoring the discussions of the terrorists and their movements. Peruvian intelligence had painstakingly tracked the movements of the terrorists. They knew where they were. What they said and how they were armed. Just as important, at the time of the raid, they knew where the hostages were.

When the initial explosion took place, three terrorists who were watching the game from upstairs and another three, who were on guard, barely had time to react. A few of them tried to open fire on the dark-clad invaders. One terrorist did manage to throw a grenade and killed one of the two soldiers who died in the assault.

The Peruvian commandos seemed to be everywhere at once. They blasted through the front door. They blew a hole into the roof. They seemed to pop out of the ground like jackrabbits.

Unlike their captors, the hostages were ready for the assault. They knowingly sprawled onto the floor and covered their faces so the terrorists couldn't tell who was who and would have a difficult time picking out the more important hostages to kill. Somebody threw a mattress over the Japanese ambassador's head to protect him.

Eleven of the 14 terrorists were killed by the initial blast and the fighting that followed. Three other terrorists could not be found, so soldiers who suspected that they were hiding in the large house, blew up part of the building to eliminate them.

The Peruvian authorities had plenty of time to plan their brilliant raid. They reportedly had been slipping into houses near the compound in civilian clothes over a period of several weeks. At a news conference, Peruvian President Fujimori did say that the commandos were trained by British and U.S. counterterrorism experts. In recent weeks, the Peruvian security forces had trained over and over for the rescue. They knew that stealth and timing were the key to success.

The key to the success of the mission was the tunnel that reportedly led to three points within the compound -- the main reception area where the terrorists were playing soccer, the kitchen and under the tent that had been set up way back in December.

A Lima newspaper reported that professional miners had started building the tunnel in January. Four man teams worked in four hour shifts. Police played loud music over large speakers outside the house to mask the sound of the digging. At the time, it was assumed that the Peruvians were waging a psychological campaign against the terrorists.

Enrique Obando, an expert on the Peruvian military, said, "Apparently, the subversives didn't have people outside who could see something was happening and communicate with those inside. They could at least have told them not to play football that day."

Tom Cash, a security consultant for Kroll Associates branch office in Miami, said, "It was as good an assault of that type as I've seen. It worked beautifully."

Like the famous 1980 SAS raid on the Iranian Embassy in London, the Lima assault on the residence of the Japanese ambassador will be studied by counterterrorism experts for many years to come.

From ENN DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT-Friday, April 25, 1997 Vol. 3 - No. 115

MRTA TERRORISTS MADE MISTAKES DURING SIEGE ...

By Steve Macko, ERRI Analyst

According to Rosemberg Pabon, the ex-rebel leader who held 17 diplomats hostage at the Dominican Embassy in Bogota for 61 days in 1980, the takeover of the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima was fatally stalled from the very beginning. Pabon was a leader of the now defunct M-19 terrorist group. He said among other mistakes was that the MRTA did not have a forceful leader on the outside to pressure for a negotiated settlement to the crisis.

Pabon said, "We had the good fortune of having our maximum leader, Jaime Bateman, on the outside."

Among the hostages that a small group of M-19 terrorists held in 1980, was a United States ambassador. Pabon, at the time, was known as "Comandante Uno."

Pabon added in his assessment of the Lima siege, "He (Bateman) was able to assess the situation with more flexibility than us -- those of us who were in the Embassy and the political prisoners themselves. He looked for and found a political way out. In Peru, their maximum leader, Victor Polay, was in jail and totally incommunicado. Other people who might have been able to help them like Issac Velazco didn't have enough strength."

Besides not having a forceful negotiator outside of the residence, Pabon said that Nestor Cerpa and his band of terrorists committed the fatal mistake of falling into a daily routine. Pabon explained, "Routine is something that works against you in these situations. We were careful and took measures to avoid an assault. We avoided routine and we changed the position of the hostages regularly."

The M-19 was active from 1974 until 1990, when most of its members accepted government peace terms that allowed them to form a political party. The group is best known for the takeover of the Palace of Justice in Bogota in November of 1985. Colombian authorities launched a 27-hour assault on the building which resulted in the death of more than 100 people -- including 11 Supreme Court justices.

Analysts were saying on Wednesday that Peruvian authorities have dealt a devastating blow to the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. The MRTA, even before 17 December, was considered to be a group that was fading. The takeover of the Japanese ambassador's residence was seen as a desperate attempt to resuscitate itself and it appears to have backfired disastrously.

But all analysts say that the MRTA will not vanish despite the failure. David Scott Palmer, an author on Peruvian guerrillas, said, "I think it is horrendous for the movement. It means the MRTA is a spent force. But there will be some sympathy for the perceived heroic action. [Editor's Note: i.e. the reaction in Guatemala City] They will not go away completely. They have come back several times."

Peruvian guerrilla analyst Carlos Tapia said, "I do not think the MRTA, at least not in the short-term, will be able to rebuild itself."

Palmer added, "The MRTA has lost most of its operational capacity. But they do have some forces left in the jungle. It is possible that within the next three months they might try to mount some desperate operation."

Peruvian historian Nelson Manrique agrees with police reports that the group was left without a leader and would need time to restructure, just as it did after the 1992 capture of its leader Victor Polay. Manrique said, "The MRTA is again left without a political direction. Nestor Cerpa was the only political leader and those remaining have little experience."

The more immediate threat of violence in Peru comes from the terrorist group known as Shining Path. Palmer said, "The Shining Path has been taking advantage of the government's distraction at the residence. It will continue to do grassroot organizing and will attack police posts and kill local officials."

From ENN DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT-Saturday, April 26, 1997 Vol. 3, No. 116

JAPAN'S LACK OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERTISE ...

By Steve Macko, ERRI Analyst

Security experts and government officials said on Wednesday that after the Lima hostage crisis Japan now realizes that its complacency made it an easy target of terrorism. Since 1977, when it became a victim of a Japanese Red Army (JRA) hijacking, Japan has been mostly free from terrorist attacks and has done little other than issue statements condemning terrorism.

Japan earned a reputation for being soft on terrorism in 1977 when then Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda freed 11 JRA terrorists after paying $6 million in ransom to free a number of hostages.

"After 1977, we were considered an easy target by terrorists," said Atsuyuki Sasa, a former official of Japan's Cabinet Security Bureau and an expert in crisis management. "Because we always surrendered to their illegal demands. This Peru crisis changed that and perhaps international terrorists will now think that it will not be easy to make such demands." Sasa believes that the Peru case has opened Japanese eyes.

Not everyone agrees. International politics professor Kenichi Ito of Aoyama Guakuin University says that Japan has a long way to go before it is ranked with other countries that fight terrorism. Ito said, "Japan contributed nothing to the resolution of this crisis."

Japanese government officials did seek a peaceful negotiated settlement to the Lima hostage crisis, but also maintained that it would not cave in to terrorist demands. However, there was a noticeable philosophical difference that would explain why the Peruvian and Japanese governments apparently were not in constant contact during the length of the ordeal. In fact, Peru reportedly did not notify Japanese authorities prior to the raid on the ambassador's residence.

Ito said, "Japan has its hands tied behind the back by this conceptual notion of post-World War Two security. If there were real trust between Peru and Japan, the prime minister would have been notified beforehand."

The assault on the Japanese compound in Lima took place early on Wednesday morning Japan time. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto was abruptly awaken from his sleep to learn of the raid.

Ito added, "It is time Japan matured and realized that peace should not be made a condition for resolving such crises, but that peace is the end goal in issues of national security."

The ability of Japan to respond to such crises is complicated by its post-WWII constitution, which forbids the country to use force to settle international disputes. Some have blamed this post war mentality for Japan's apparent lack of preparedness for dealing with violent crisis. Others suggest that non-intervention and the continued payment of ransom has actually been a government policy for resolving such disputes.

An official at the defense ministry's anti-terrorist desk said that Japan's constitution makes it impossible to station military guards at its overseas missions like the United States and other nations.

According to analysts, the Lima hostage situation was just another example of Japan's lack of crisis expertise. In January of 1995, an earthquake rocked the city of Kobe and killed more than 5,500 people. It was reported that it took then prime minister Tomiichi Murayama several hours before he even realized that a major natural disaster had struck his country and there was a substantial delay of sending the necessary emergency resources into the stricken area.

From ENN Daily Intelligence Report-Sunday, April, 27, 1997 - Vol. 3, No. 117

Criticism of Peru Hostage Rescue is Simply "Wrongheaded"

Editorial Opinion

By Clark Staten, ENN Publisher and ERRI Senior Analyst

Chicago, IL (ENN) The ink had hardly dried on literally dozens of articles proclaiming the recent hostage rescue operation in Lima, Peru a "textbook operation" and a "complete success," when the first allegations of malfeasance by Peruvian forces began to surface.

Apparently originating in the left-wing (and admittedly "opposition") 'La Republica' newspaper in Peru, Peruvian reporters began to allege that the Peruvian assault force had killed MRTA rebels that had tried to surrender during the assault on the Japanese ambassador's compound.

Other "revolutionary groups" and anti-Fujimori forces quickly picked up on these reports and quickly spread them on the internet and through international news agencies. By Sunday morning, several U.S. news programs and media pundits had begun to question whether or not Peruvian Commandos had "viciously executed" rebels, who had "clearly" indicated their desire to "surrender peacefully" in the midst of an explosive and dynamic entry into the besieged residence.

President Alberto Fujimori openly rejected such allegations and simply said, "it not true," according to comments he made to the Associated Press. Fujimori went on to say that the objective was to release the hostages without harm, not to slay hostage takers. All fourteen MRTA rebels were killed during the assault, along with two special forces commandos.

Unfortunately, we must disagree with President Fujimori...the cold, hard, reality is that the purpose of the commando assault was to kill the hostage takers, and to do so in as rapid a manner as possible, before they had an opportunity to shoot or blow up 72 hostages with pre-placed explosive charges. To do otherwise could have resulted in disaster.

We must also respectfully suggest that when the assault had begun that the time for surrender has long passed. The MRTA terrorists had four months of opportunities to surrender and end the hostage incident in a peaceful manner...they made a conscious decision not to do so. Further, it is obvious that the rebels should have been more than well aware of the dangers and repercussions of their violent take-over of the Japanese compound.

To suggest, after the fact, that the use of extreme violence in the retaking of Ambassador Yukihiko Ikeda's residence was inappropriate, is simply naive, wrongheaded, and misinformed. It would appear to be the product of a disgruntled left-wing attempt to try to gain some sort of belated propaganda victory and establish the dead MRTA terrorists as "martyrs in a larger revolutionary struggle."

The fact of the matter is...that the actions of the Peruvian commandos were totally justified and proper. Regardless of the cries of detractors, Mr. Fujimori and the 140 special forces soldiers should be commended and supported in their defense of diplomatic and democratic principles. Other countries could be well-served by emulating Peru's patience, steadfastness, and final ferocity in the face of on-going terrorist threats.

The ENN DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT is a subscription publication of the EmergencyNet NEWS Service, which is a part of the Chicago-based Emergency Response and Research Institute. This publication specializes in Corporate and Personal Security/Terrorism/Intelligence/Military and National Security issues.

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