For Immediate Release (Revised 08-16-93) 1230 HRS. CST
U.S. OPTIONS AGAINST LIBYAN TERRORISTS
By: Clark Staten, EmergencyNet News Analyst
Chicago, IL. Joint Grand Jury indictments in Scotland
and the U.S. District of Columbia signify both an opportunity
and a complex problem for the United States. While they
show a desire by both governments to bring Libyans
Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah to
justice for their alleged bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, they
also present a law enforcement and diplomatic "nightmare".
Neither the United States or Scotland has an extradition
treaty with the country of Libya, where both of the alleged
"intelligence operatives" are said to be residing.
This perplexing situation causes the United States to
consider what some would suggest are "extra-legal" special
operations to extract the justice that is being demanded by
the families of the 189 Americans that were killed by the
sophisticated explosive device that exploded over Lockerbie
Scotland. The legally binding dual indictments should,
however, serve to add legitimacy to whatever actions are
undertaken by the United States and British authorities to
effect the "arrest" and prosecution of the alleged
terrorists. Various policy precedents that have been
previously set should serve to help guide the decision
making process regarding the pursuit of the Flt. 103
suspects. An examination of history should help to define
the options that are open to the U.S.
The first option is a comparatively easy one. It involves the
country of Libya deciding to voluntarily extradite the
suspects to stand trial. This option allows the Libyans to
claim that the suspects were "rogue agents" who acted on
their own and without sanction by the Qadhaffi
regime. This option would seem to blunt the possibility of
Mohammar Qadhaffi and the country of Libya being attacked in
some way, as the perpetrators of "state supported terrorism".
Intelligence analysts, however, discount the possibility of
this option, because it is unlikely that
Qadhaffi will admit culpability in the massacre. He is far
more likely to deny publically any involvement, while
privately touting this bombing as retribution on the "Great
Satan of the United States" for previous attacks on Libya.
The second option that might be considered is largely a
diplomatic one. It concerns the use of condemnation in the
United Nations, economic sanctions, and even a possible
blockade of Libyan ports. This option would is one
of the safest choices, in that it doesn't require direct
intervention into or against Libya. It's primary hope is
that economic and public opinion sanctions will cause
Qadhaffi to relent and release the suspects to U.S. or
British custody. Again, many commentators do not believe
that Qadhaffi will be swayed by opinion or economic
sanctions.
The country of Libya and Qadhaffi have shown that they, like
Saddam Hussein of Iraq, can be self-supporting and
seemingly independent of any action of the United Nations or
the World Court. In fact, most analysts agree that Qadhaffi
would view "sanctions" as weakness by the United
States and Great Britain. The United States, however, will
undoubtedly undertake this option at the onset of the
negotiations, so as to maintain a moral "high-ground". The
ultimate success of this option is unlikely.
A third option is one that has been used against "Narco-
Terrorists" in Central and South America. It involves the use
of federal special operations agents (e.g., CIA/SOF), who use
a "smash and grab" method of extracting the Libyan operatives
from their safe haven and rapidly transport them to a nearby
country that has an extradition treaty with the United
States. This is a far more risky option, because it requires
lightly armed American agents to enter Libya to
undertake the capture.
This method is frequently used in conjunction with the
assistance of "sleeper" or undercover assets (operatives)
that are already in place in the country of opportunity. This
method requires extensive surveillance of the suspects,
communication, and cooperation with the "arresting force",
before the actual capture. The network of allied
intelligence agents in Libya is thought by many to be very
limited. This limited capability may preclude using this
method of extradition, but does not rule it out entirely.
The next (fourth) option that is considered "draconian" by
many, involves the use of military/intelligence operatives in
a violent extension of the "smash and grab" theory. It
causes special operations forces to be used to "terminate the
alleged terrorists with extreme prejudice". Fortunately or
unfortunately, depending on your point of view, congressional
mandates prohibit the direct assassination of foreign
nationals by U.S. agents.
Anti-terrorist operatives, however, debate the issue and
possibility of "hiring" other foreign nationals to carry out
the killings. Historically, the Israelis have proven
themselves willing and able to perform "wet work" (political
assassination) against terrorist forces. In light of
Operation Desert Storm and American intervention on their
behalf, it is possible that Israel could be persuaded to
dispatch the terrorists. America may not choose to undertake
this option, because it can be viewed in a
negative light by world opinion.
The fifth option would provide for direct military
intervention in the region. It would be configured in a
manner similar to that carried out against Panamanian
strongman Manuel Noreiga. "Operation Just Cause",
historically, was undertaken to "arrest" Noreiga to stand
trial in the United States for conspiracy to smuggle drugs
into America. A direct parallel can be drawn to the needed
arrest of the Libyan terrorists. In this light, the use of
force may be considered legitimate in the view of other
nations. Several Mid-East observers would suggest that at
least tacit approval of adjoining nations would be necessary
before the invasion of Libya.
This option would require extensive military, logistical
support and planning; it could border on requiring
congressional approval. Members of both houses of congress
could be expected to call this type of operation "gun-boat
diplomacy". Some could suggest that the United States was
waging war on Libya and thus, would require congressional
approval. The likelihood of that approval, following the
vast expenditures involved in Operation Desert Storm is open
to question. Many would suggest that the President needs to
focus on domestic issues, rather than to prompt a military
incursion into a small, relatively powerless, country many
miles away. This option would, however, send a clear
message to insurgents in the Middle East and elsewhere that
the United States will not tolerate violence against its
citizens.
Another (sixth) option would place "the illness of
retaliation" on another nation. It would suggest that
Scotland (through Great Britain) should take the appropriate
actions to cause the arrest and trial of the suspects. It
would base this decision on the fact that the crime occurred
in Scotland's jurisdiction and they should be the ones to
prosecute the atrocity. This seemingly "isolationist"
viewpoint avoids the necessity of American action against the
terrorists and Libya. While probably not the most decisive
choice of these options, it does allow America a viable
alternative of avoiding public and congressional displeasure,
while appearing to cooperate with the international
community in the pursuit of the perpetrators.
The last (seventh) option is an extension of both the
policies that were undertaken against Iraq and those
previously used against Libya. It involves the use of U.S.
Navy planes to bomb the country of Libya into submission.
The U.S. Mediterranean Fleet is already in place and could be
activated to begin bombing within hours of a Presidential
order. This option could be an attractive one, in that it
has been used before against Qadhaffi and minimizes the
threat to American forces. The use of F-117A "Stealth
fighter/bombers", B-2A bombers, and other carrier based
high technology aircraft could strike a decisive blow against
Libya, with few American casualties.
The viability of this idea would be dependent on the
mindset of Libyan leader Qadhaffi. If he chose to resist the
bombing and attempted to retaliate against the United States
or her allies in the region, the conflict would undoubtedly
escalate. On the other hand, if he chose to turn over the
suspects without hostilities, he could avert potential
disaster for his country. In either case, the United States
would have demonstrated that "Terrorism" in any form is
unacceptable and that countries that support it are subject
to retaliation.
CONCLUSION
Reality probably will dictate that a combination of these
options will ultimately be used. Indecisiveness, by the
United States, will not seem be an acceptable response to
the indictment of the Libyan terrorists. In fact, this
situation would appear to offer an opportunity for
President Bush to show the strength of American conviction
against international terrorism, and to reaffirm this
country's participation in the President's vision of a "New
World Order". Only by positively demonstrating that the
world is run by a system of socially acceptable laws and
behaviors, can the future threat of terrorism be eliminated.
(c) EmergencyNET NEWS Service, 1993
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