**LEAD STORY**
For those who are not familar with intelligence agency operations -- for the most part, it is not like what you see in James Bond movies. The vast majority of the time is spent in collecting intelligence (information), analyzing it and then writing papers, such as this report, on subjects.
Mr. Lewis would like to hear any comments on this analysis or any analysis that anyone else may have to offer. You can send your comments to: enn@emergency.com and we'd be more than happy to pass them on.)
In a recent assessment of statements by a defecting North Korean F-6 (MiG-19) pilot about the likelihood of a North Korean invasion in late 1996/early 1997, I stated that this would place the invasion in the dead of winter, causing untold problems for the attacking armored forces. One very astute reader of this assessment pointed out, very correctly, that in armored warfare, winter's freezing of rivers and marshes presents an advantage in freedom of movement. The tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) are no longer restricted to improved roads, where their movement is limited, thus making them relatively easy prey for attacking aircraft and artillery with pre-registered killing zones.
Winter does offer wider avenues of approach afforded by frozen ground and this was one reason why it was feared--and reported--that Croatia was planning to mount an assault against Serb rebels in Eastern Slavonia this past winter (January 1996). Armor would be able to spread out on the marshy soil of the region and avoid being bracketed by artilleryregistered to hit targets confined to roads. But that operation was to be conducted on level terrain in a river flood plain.
There are some disadvantages to armored warfare in winter, particularly in mountainous terrain such as that in Korea. For one, snow and ice tend to complicate your re-supply efforts. Although tanks and APCs can quickly advance and avoid being caught on roads, the support vehicles bringing up ammunition and the vital fuel replenishment to maintain such a thrust must make its way through roads covered with ice and snow.
Whereas the tracks on tanks and APCs allow them to negotiate snowbanks and afford some traction on river ice, soft-skinned, wheeled support vehicles do not have these luxuries, often getting bogged down in snow and slush, which quickly degenerates into mud if the road is heavily traveled. As for ice, it is difficult to achieve good traction even on flat ice over a frozen river, much less maintain control on sheets of ice covering steep, narrow, winding roads in mountain valleys.
In the first Korean war, even tanks were known to slide off of mountain roads slickened with ice. Once the armored vehicles make it to open, flat terrain, the winter freeze allows greater freedom of movement, insofar as the terrain that is available for travel, but their support vehicles would face a nightmare trying to keep up with them. This would place the entire offensive at risk.
North Korea also has some unique problems in that its fuel reserves should be very low. Operations in winter tend to expend more fuel because the tanks must be run up more often to keep their batteries charged and vehicles spend more fuel trying to compensate for the loss of traction. More fuel also has to be expended carrying extra clothing, supplies and heating fuel (kerosene, charcoal) to keep the troops warm in their camps.
This is not simply for creature comforts but a matter of mere survival in the harsh Korean winter. For every pound of charcoal heating fuel carried, a transport vehicle uses extra fuel. To compound the problem, that charcoal takes up space and fuel which could be devoted to other essential war-fighting materials like ammunition, fuel, food, medicine, etc. Pound for pound, winter is a much less efficient season in which to fight a war if you are critically short of fuel.
There are some other little-considered drawbacks to winter warfare. For one, you can't hide. Smoke and heat from exhausts which would be invisible or would quickly dissipate in warmer area seems to billow up in large clouds that don't diffuse well in the heavier cold air. This makes it easier for attacking pilots to attack, once the heavy clouds have parted or risen to altitudes which allow for effective attacks. Again, once the clouds have given way enough to make reconnaissance flights practical, the vehicle tracks and footprints are an intelligence bonanza, not only giving the enemy's location but a clue to his strength. Trees no longer have leaves, making it harder to hide.
In the first Korean war, Chinese troops were able to infiltrate into North Korea without being undetected for weeks prior to their appearance in November 1950. Had they tried to do so later, after considerable snow had fallen, the troops' body heat would have melted the snow off the roofs of buildings they hid in during the day. Rail cars carrying troops also would have been clear of any snow, while others on a train would retain some. Also, all of the heavy foot traffic would have shown up in the snow leading to such buildings. In 1950, these clues would have been too subtle. In 1996, imagery interpreters had better be on the watch for such things during the winter.
2. PILOT'S TRACK SUIT: It has also been stated that he was wearing a track suit under his flight uniform instead of insulated underwear. Keep in mind that this is not winter. Although it does get cold in the upper altitudes, it is not extremely cold this time of year. In fact, on the ground, it is probably getting very warm. His feet would need insulation due to the tendency for extremities to suffer more from the cold. For those who are not aware, pilots tend to wear the lightest clothing possible under their flight suits. This affords more freedom of movement, prevents over-heating and is generally more comfortable. I am, therefore, simply amazed at the great media frenzy and the apparent fascination of trained (?) "intelligence analysts" whom have become so taken with this individual's personal clothing.
Think about this in simple terms for a moment: The North Korean military is a respected and even pampered element of their society, and Air Force pilots are probably considered the cream of the crop. How is it, then, that everybody else in North Korea has socks but one of the elite? The "logic" surrounding this subject has been that, well, if he can't even get a pair of socks, the North is falling apart faster than we ever imagined. Get real! THINK!! If there is no cotton to make socks, how did they happen to have cotton for the wrappings? If there is no functioning garment industry, why isn't everybody in North Korea walking around naked or in tattered rags? If there is no power to run the factories, the looms, the sewing machines, etc., then nobody would have any clothes and they would not only be hungry but naked as well!
At some point, common sense has to prevail here and it really concerns me that so much has been made of minor issues that are either easily explained or easy to dismiss as relatively unimportant, yet US and ROK Intelligence seems incapable of seeing some important clues that this man very probably is not a legitimate defector but a deliberate plant, and for the following reasons:
This defector offers far too much information and much of what he presents should be well beyond his scope of knowledge or security clearances. He is either lying or is a deliberate plant by the North Koreans to convince the ROK and US that any invasion plans will not be acted upon until late 96/early 97.
If my suspicions are correct, such invasion plans have a much closer timetable. In addition, I would also watch for signs of increased terrorist activity in Japan. It may only be a coincidence, but Reuters is reporting that Japanese police are stepping up their campaign to capture remaining fugitives from the Aum Shinrikyo cult blamed for last year's sarin nerve gas attacks. I would be on the lookout for any unusual events in Japan for I believe North Korea is going to stage further assaults in an attempt to coerce Japan into withholding support for any American response to an invasion in Korea.
(NOTE: Another version of this document was prepared and sent out early in the morning of May 31. Within minutes after sending it, I scanned Reuters press reports on Asia and found that Japanese authorities are announcing that there have been a number of brushes with "disaster" because unknown parties with specialized knowledge of trains have been sabotaging tracks of high-speed commuter trains around Tokyo. Large and heavy objects have been left on the tracks and other acts of sabotage have been reported. Special teams of inspectors are now combing the tracks to look for any such sabotage. Japanese officials are trying to blame it on disgruntled former workers with the railroad which was privatized 10 years ago, leading to job losses. However, 10 years is a long time to hold a grudge. Could it be yet another attempt to demonstrate to the Japanese people and authorities just how easily their "safe" and orderly society can be disrupted by terrorist acts?)
In addition, an invasion would likely occur on a weekend when people would be more prone to relax. It is always possible that an attack could happen during the week as well, on the assumption that a weekend attack would be expected. You begin to see here how difficult it is to assess such things--there are simply so many variables to consider.
If I'm correct in my theory that North Korea will attempt to intimidate and coerce Japan into refusing or restricting use of Japanese bases and facilities by US forces, we should see a sharp increase in terrorist-type activirties within Japan some time shortly before an invasion kicks off. Watching the weather and events in Japan will be important. If I am correct, a coincidence of marginal weather and heightened tension in Japan may be a direct precursor to an attack on South Korea by the North.
(c) EmergencyNet News Service and Mr. Ron Lewis, 1996, All rights reserved.