GLOBAL THREATS
AND CHALLENGES TO THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS INTERESTS ABROAD
Statement For The
Senate Select Committee On Intelligence
5 February 1997
Statement For The
Senate Armed Services Committee On Intelligence
6 February 1997
By Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes,
USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Gen. Hughes
Comments:
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide a
Defense Intelligence Agency perspective on the threats and
challenges facing the United States and its interests, now and
well into the next century. It is important to note at the outset
that this testimony directly reflects the baseline threat
assessment DIA has provided to the Joint Staff and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense in support of the ongoing Quadrennial
Defense Review. This review of the global security environment
assumes that the United States remains a global power
politically, economically, and militarily, and that our country
continues its active engagement in world affairs. If either of
those assumptions are wrong, then the threat picture depicted
here would change significantly. Finally, this analysis presents
a global overview of the future in somewhat linear form -- that
is, we are providing our best estimate, from today's perspective,
under the working premise that current trends and conditions will
continue to evolve along discernible lines. We recognize,
however, that the future is non-linear, and that what we present
here is likely to change. To address that concern, DIA analysts
will continue to examine and study alternatives and excursions to
each specific condition, event, and circumstance.
THE NEW
ORDER...TRANSITION, TURMOIL, AND UNCERTAINTY
"There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more
perilous
to conduct or more uncertain in its success, than to take the
lead in the introduction of a new order of things." MACHIAVELLI
The world is in the midst of an extended post-Cold War transition
that will last at least another decade. Many factors and forces
are at work during this transition and some aspects of it have so
far been very positive. The community of democratic states is
expanding, the world economy has largely recovered from the
decline of the late 80's and early 90's, and most experts expect
steady, positive global economic growth -- on the order of four
percent per year -- well beyond the next decade. From a national
security standpoint, the threats facing the United States have
diminished in order of magnitude, and we are unlikely to face a
global military challenger on the scale of the former Soviet
Union for at least the next two decades. The world is spending in
real terms some 30-40 percent less on defense than it did during
the height of the Cold War, the "rogue"states are
relatively isolated, and at least one -- North Korea -- is
probably terminal.
But despite these and other positive developments, this era of
transition remains complex and dangerous. In much of the world,
there still exists a potentially explosive mix of social,
demographic, economic, and political conditions which run counter
to the global trend toward democracy and economic reform. I will
highlight the most significant of these.
Demographic Trends
Global population will increase some 20 percent between now and
2010, with 95 percent of that growth occurring in the developing
areas that can least afford it. Many of these states will
experience the "youth bulge phenomena" (a relatively
high percentage of the population between 18 and 25 years of age)
which, historically, has been a key factor in instability. At the
same time, we are witnessing virtually unchecked urbanization in
many developing regions as millions of the world's poorest people
move from rural to urban areas each year. These factors are
straining the leadership, infrastructure, and resources of many
developing states and regions. Some governments -- mostly in the
developing world -- will be unable to cope with these challenges.
Growing Humanitarian Needs
A combination of several factors -- the great disparity in
north-south distribution of wealth, rising nationalism, the
violent fragmentation of existing states due to ethnic,
religious, political, and economic strife, and the steady
occurrence of natural disasters -- has led to dramatic increases
in both the number and scale of humanitarian operations. Compared
to the 1980's, such crises are four times more frequent, last
longer, and are more dangerous to respond to because they more
frequently involve large numbers of internally displaced persons
located in remote, conflict-ridden regions. One measurable
consequence of these trends is the significant increase in the
number, size, cost, and intensity of UN Peace Operations over the
past decade. While there is some evidence that these trends have
leveled off over the past few years, the plateau is a high one,
and we expect no significant decrease over the next decade or so.
Resource Scarcity
While most experts predict global resource availability will keep
pace with increased consumption, local and regional shortages
will occur more frequently, particularly in areas experiencing
rapid population increases and/or expanded economic growth. These
shortages will retard economic, social, and environmental
progress, and will frequently be seen by affected peoples and
states as a distribution contest in which the needs of others
have been given priority for political, economic, or social
reasons. Such perceptions will increase the potential for
violence -- moves by individual nations to control fresh water
supplies already contribute to tensions among nations and future
conflicts over water are increasingly likely. On a global scale,
the worldwide demand for Persian Gulf oil will remain high and,
for regions such as Asia, dependency on Gulf oil could reach 90
percent of total oil imports by the end of the next decade. This
dependence places a very high premium on ensuring stability in
this troubled region.
WMD and Missile Proliferation
Proliferation -- particularly with regard to nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons and missile delivery systems --
constitutes a direct threat to US interests worldwide. Many
states view the acquisition of these capabilities as vital to
countering US conventional warfighting superiority and to
providing an unparalleled measure of power, respect, and
deterrent value within a regional context. Currently some two
dozen states remain actively engaged in the pursuit of weapons of
mass destruction -- we do not expect that number to grow
substantially. While nuclear technology is difficult and
expensive to obtain, counter-proliferation efforts are not
perfect, and one or more of the determined rogue states are
likely to develop or acquire nuclear weapons over the next
decade. One complicating factor is the security of weapons-usable
materiel within the former Soviet Union. Although the Russians
are working in good faith to protect such materiel and related
capabilities, the potential for loss of control will remain with
us into the foreseeable future, in part because of the unstable
conditions in Russia.
Chemical and biological agents are likely to be more widely
proliferated. Chemical weapons are easiest to develop, deploy,
and hide and the technology and materials to produce relatively
sophisticated weapons are readily available, often as dual-use
items in the commercial world. Similarly, biological weapons
technology is also widely available but handling and weaponizing
is more difficult.
In my view, ballistic and cruise missile proliferation presents
one of the greatest emerging threats to US regional interests and
deployed forces. The types of missiles most likely to be
proliferated in significant numbers -- SCUD upgrades and UAV-like
cruise missile variants -- and the nations which field them, will
generally not have the technical sophistication or targeting
support which is available to more advanced military powers. But
these missiles will have sufficient range, accuracy, and payloads
to deliver WMD or conventional warheads inter-regionally to the
vicinity of an intended target. As such, they pose a direct
threat to fixed targets such as large personnel and equipment
concentrations, airfields, seaports, ships at pier or anchor, C3
nodes, logistics/transportation centers, and amphibious assault
zones. Possession of such weapons by adversaries complicates US
and Allied planning, decisionmaking, and operations, and is a
source of local and regional instability.
Regarding longer range missiles, fewer than five nations now
possess operational theater ballistic missiles with ranges
greater than 500 km -- that number could grow to more than 10 by
2010. In terms of intercontinental missiles, it is unlikely that
any state, other than the declared nuclear powers, will develop
or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years
that could directly target the United States. However, in this
key area, I believe we could encounter some form of technical
surprise, where a rogue state could acquire the capability to
build and use a missile which could threaten our vital interests.
We must carefully monitor this potential threat.
The Rejection of Western Culture
The abrupt end of the Cold War, the rapid spread of western
values, ideals, and institutions, and the dramatic personal,
societal, and global changes underway as a result of the global
village phenomenon and broad technology proliferation, are
changing fundamental concepts, beliefs, and allegiances in many
areas of the world. Those peoples, groups, and governments who
are unable to cope with or unwilling to embrace these changes
frequently resent the dominant role played by the United States
in the international security environment, and attempt to
undermine US and western influence and interests. Two aspects of
this condition are particularly noteworthy. First, although there
is not at present an ideology that is both inimical to our
interests and widely appealing, one could conceivably arise under
the rhetoric of providing a counterpoint to western culture.
Second, the perception of western political, economic, and
especially military "dominance" means that many of our
enemies will choose asymmetric means to attack our interests --
that is, pursuing courses of action that attempt to take
advantage of their perceived strengths while exploiting our
perceived weaknesses. At the "strategic" level, this
probably means seeking to avoid direct military confrontation
with US forces; at the operational and tactical levels it means
seeking ways of "leveling the playing field" if forced
to engage the US military.
Terrorism
Terrorism will remain a major transnational problem, driven by
continued ethnic, religious, nationalist, separatist, political,
and economic motivations. One worrying trend is the rise of
terrorists groups that are more multinational in scale of
operation and less responsive to domestic or external influences.
Middle East-based terrorism, especially that supported by Iran
and private sources in several other countries, remains the
primary terrorist threat to US interests. While advanced and
exotic weapons are increasingly available, their employment is
likely to remain minimal as terrorist groups concentrate on
peripheral technologies -- communications, more sophisticated
conventional weapons, and weapon disguise techniques -- that
improve the prospects for successful execution of attacks. If
weapons of mass destruction are used, chemical or biological
agents would likely be the choice, since they are easier to
build, hide, and transport. The Japanese experience with the Aum
Shin-Rykyo sect is a harbinger of what is possible in the future.
The Drug Trade
The international drug trade is becoming more complex as new
areas of drug cultivation and transit continue to emerge and
international criminal syndicates take advantage of rapid
advancements in global communications, transportation, and
finance to mask their illicit operations. Drug-related crime and
corruption will remain endemic throughout the major drug source
and transit countries. Non-democratic states, or those with weak
democratic traditions, are particularly susceptible to criminal
penetration of police, security, legislative, judicial, banking,
and media organizations, and to insurgency which is supported by
narco-trafficking. Drug money will retain its influence in
populations with little or no opportunity for equivalent,
legitimate sources of income and employment. This situation
produces a newly monied element in drug-producing and transit
countries, and engenders serious, often violent clashes between
and among these elements, established social structures, and
national governments. These drug trafficking constituencies also
contribute to tensions between their countries and other
governments, notably consumer nations. One especially troublesome
trend is the rise of urban drug production using non-organic
chemicals. These production facilities are relatively easy to
conceal, their product is easy to transport and distribute and,
since the distance between producer and consumer is minimal, the
supply is difficult to interdict.
Critical
Uncertainties
Beyond the obvious challenges outlined above, there is
significant uncertainty surrounding today's international
security environment. The end of the Cold War had three key
strategic consequences -- the collapse of international
communism, the demise of the USSR, and a hiatus in bipolar
competition. These consequences, in turn, are affecting power and
security relationships throughout the world. One result is the
relative dispersal of power away from the states of the former
Soviet Union toward regional power centers. Another is the
potential struggle within regions as the dominant states vie for
position within the emerging power hierarchy. A third is that in
many regions the "lid has come off" long simmering
ethnic, religious, territorial, and economic disputes. These
conditions are taxing the capabilities of what are still largely
Cold War era international security concepts, institutions, and
structures. The process of adapting the old security structures
and developing new ones is often complex and confrontational.
This will be particularly true within the remnant states of the
former Soviet Union.
Beyond 2010, as the world becomes more multi-polar, there is the
potential for increasedcompetition among and between the major
powers for access to or control of resources, markets, and
technology. The nature and extent of that competition will be a
key determinant of international stability. One potential
consequence of that competition would be the formation of
strategic alliances between two or more major powers that
directly challenged US security interests. Overall, we expect
future alliances and coalitions will be based more on specific
issues than dogma or enduring ideology, and will therefore be
more flexible in their membership and less durable than during
the Cold War.
In addition to the broad uncertainty outlined above, the future
of Russia and China -- two major powers undergoing great change
-- plus other issues such as the dynamics on the Korean
peninsula, the prospects for lasting peace or continuing conflict
in the Middle East, genocide, ethnic, religious, and tribal
conflict in Africa, the global impact of the proliferation of
military technology, and an array of upcoming leadership changes,
are but a few of the more specific uncertain circumstances we
face.
CHARACTERIZING THE
THREAT
"Gentlemen, I notice that there are always three courses
(of action) open to an enemy and that he usually takes the
fourth." von Moltke the Elder
This backdrop of change, turmoil, and uncertainty presents a
complex strategic planning environment in which new challenges
and opportunities arise on a daily basis. The critical task for
military intelligence is to discern from these general conditions
a more precise characterization of emerging threats -- that is,
the unique combination of location and circumstance, US
interests, and a potential enemy's capabilities, intentions, and
will.
One key to understanding the strategic level of this dynamic is
to recognize those conditions that would threaten our vital
interests. A generalized list would include: the rise of an
ideology inimical to US ideals, concepts, and values; denial of
access to key resources and markets; regional or local
instability in areas of US vital interest; and the emergence of
foreign military capabilities that undermine our general
deterrent and warfighting superiority.
Another important factor in identifying emerging threats -- and
also critical to deconflicting disputes or to crisis and conflict
management -- is an understanding of the reasons why peoples,
leaders, and states engage in warfare. Generally, these include:
competition grounded in antiquity; internal or external pressures
on leaders, governments, and states; competition over access to
or control of markets and resources; and dissatisfaction with
present conditions or the perceived "likely" future.
A third imperative for discerning emerging threats is to
understand the components of enemy capability, intent, and will.
In most cases (barring exceptional technology breakthroughs or
innovative doctrinal advancements) the intelligence community has
enough information to measure and understand the capabilities of
our adversaries. Intent, however, is another matter. Without
indwelling or invasive sources, we cannot adequately anticipate
or understand true intent. Will -- being a function of dynamic
conditions as well as the emotions and perceptions of leaders --
is constantly in flux and very difficult to know with certainty.
Using this analytic framework, and our assessment of the global
security environment, we can make a number of judgments about
current and future threats to US interests. These judgments fall
into four broad categories: the emergence of a new threat
paradigm; a reaffirmation -- albeit with some modifications -- of
the traditional conflict spectrum; an analysis of key regional
threats; and a look at future warfare trends.
The New Threat Paradigm
First, the threat paradigm has shifted from the "known"
enemies of the Cold War to a more generalized, global set of
potential competitors, adversaries, and conflict circumstances,
some of which do not conform to traditional nation-state or
alliance definitions but rather transcend political boundaries
and territorial limitations. These may be classified as follows:
* Partners and allies, who generally share US values and
interests and may be military allies. Often, however, these
states produce weapons, technologies and other products that,
once proliferated, enhance the capabilities of our enemies. In
this regard, our partners and allies often present the
"pacing technology threats" for US weapons and
technology development.
* Non-compliant competitors who generally do not conform to our
values and interests, but are not military adversaries. While
they are frequently in opposition to US political, economic, and
strategic goals and may undertake actions which compromise or
endanger our interests, they do not generally engage in violence.
* Renegade adversaries, who engage in unacceptable behavior
frequently involving military force and violence, are potential
enemies of the US, and against whom we must consider the active
use of military force.
* Emergency conditions -- usually involving humanitarian
disasters, attempts at deconfliction of warring groups, and/or
the restoration of civil control -- which could require the
commitment of military force, often in threatening and sometimes
lethal conditions.
The key conclusion from this new threat paradigm is that the
nature of potential and actual conflict and the dimensions of it
will vary broadly from place to place and circumstance to
circumstance, bounded only by the dimensions of the conflict
spectrum and the wide variety of conditions that are physically
possible. Thus it is vital that we understand conditions and
circumstances extant.
The Conflict Spectrum
From the foregoing analysis, it seems apparent that specific
situations for US force employment can still arise anywhere along
the traditional spectrum of potential contingencies, from
conflict short of war, to conventional (both local and regional)
war, to global nuclear war. However, the probability of
large-scale regional war or global nuclear war is much lower
today than during the Cold War. Indeed, it is unlikely to occur.
It is most probable that US involvement will occur along the
lower end of the conflict spectrum. Chemical, biological, and
information warfare transcend the entire conflict spectrum and
can occur at any time. International terrorism will remain a
transnational problem but will mainly be a factor at the lower
end of the conflict spectrum. It is important to note that we see
an increased probability that chemical (and perhaps biological)
weapons will be employed, albeit generally within the context of
very limited use and very restricted kinds of conflict.
Simultaneity
We must also include in our assessment the concept of
simultaneity -- the possibility (probability) that several
separate events or conditions will occur simultaneously, or
concurrently, over time. Thus, we must anticipate a threat
environment in which more than one substantial threat condition
will require a direct military response by the United States.
Regional Threats
Although no state will have the combined political, economic, and
military power to present a peer challenge to the United States
over the next two decades, a number of regional powers, that do
not necessarily share the US vision of the future, will retain
significant capabilities to threaten our interests.
North Korea
North Korea's capability to conduct large-scale combat operations
continues to deteriorate as worsening internal economic
conditions undermine training, readiness, and sustainment.
Nevertheless, Pyongyang retains the potential to inflict enormous
destruction on South Korea and a Korean war scenario remains our
primary near-term military concern. With the North's forward
positioning of strike forces -- artillery, missiles, rocket
launchers, and aircraft -- war on the peninsula could erupt with
little warning. Given the time and distance factors involved, and
the fact that large civilian population and economic centers
would be at risk from the outset of conflict, the situation is
particularly troublesome.
For the future, we continue to assess that Pyongyang sees its
best chance for survival in continued interaction with the west.
The key will be how North Korea's uncertain and unstable
leadership handles the increasing internal pressures resulting
from long-term economic and social deterioration. Given these
conditions, and the fact that our access to the North is limited,
we must remain vigilant for both "implosion" and
"explosion" possibilities.
China
The key long-term security issue in Asia is the growth of Chinese
power -- more specifically, how China itself and the other
regional powers adapt to and accommodate that development. In our
judgment, China will continue to give priority to economic
progress and modernization through at least the next decade as it
moves forward in the transition to a new era of political
leadership and regional influence. The result is likely to be
continued high rates of economic growth (above 5 percent per
year) and China's probable emergence, over the next 10-20 years,
as the preeminent Asian-Pacific regional power (excluding the
US). Should China become more assertive and aggressive in that
role, the prospects for direct confrontation with other regional
powers will increase accordingly. In a worst-case scenario, China
would view the United States as a direct military threat.
The next several years should provide some important clues in
this regard. China's actions with respect to key Asian security
issues -- the reversion of Hong Kong later this year, Beijing's
role in managing developments on the Korean peninsula, and its
posture regarding Taiwan -- will be key indicators of China's
long-term security outlook.
Over the near term, we continue to monitor China's military
development. PLA capabilities remain constrained at present --
despite steady levels of defense spending -- due to weaknesses in
force projection, logistics, training, and command and control.
But the military leadership is intent on addressing those
shortfalls and is developing a more robust capability. To
accomplish this, China continues to accord the highest priority
-- beyond strategic force enhancements -- to acquiring advanced
air, air defense, and sea denial capabilities, through both
indigenous production and foreign purchases. In our judgment it
will take at least a decade before China can acquire, absorb, and
integrate these new capabilities; beyond that time frame,
however, China will have real potential for significant increases
in military effectiveness.
In part to fund modernization, Beijing is cutting force
structure, particularly within the Army, but will retain forces
that will be large and capable by regional and global standards.
Following the doctrinal charge to "prepare for local war
under high technology conditions" China's military is also
emphasizing key force multipliers (e.g. electronic
countermeasures, low observable technologies, and advanced SAMs),
information warfare capabilities, and unconventional
countermeasures and tactics.
Overall, China is one of the few powers with the potential --
political, economic, and military -- to emerge as a large-scale
regional threat to US interests within the next 10-20 years.
Given Asia's growing global economic importance, its unsettled
security picture, and the fact that four of the world's major
powers -- China, Russia, Japan, and the US -- all have interests
and a presence there, the continued monitoring of Asia's security
environment -- and notably its biggest country, China -- will
remain a primary task for the US Defense Intelligence Community.
Russia
As China is the key to long-term stability in Asia, Russia is the
key to stability in Europe. And like China, Russia also has the
potential to emerge as a large-scale regional threat to US
interests within the next two decades. Accordingly, Russia's
political and military future remains one of our key security
concerns. For the near-to-midterm outlook, we expect slow
progress along the current reform path as Moscow adapts and
evolves in response to the tremendous political, economic,
social, and security challenges confronting it. We expect
continued political turmoil, periodic crisis, and weaknesses in
democratic values and institutions, as well as continued crime
and corruption. Russia is likely to remain focused internally or
on the "near abroad" unless Moscow perceives vital
interests are at stake. Over the longer term, Russia will
eventually stabilize and recover, and exhibit more nationalistic
tendencies, motivated by a desire to reestablish its great power
status.
In the meantime, Russia's strategic nuclear forces are the
backbone of Moscow's military might, preserving Russia's
perception of great power status and protecting its vital
security interests. Russian general purpose forces retain
sufficient capabilities to defend the country and conduct limited
operations in the "near abroad", but are staggering
under the cumulative impact of long-term leadership problems and
serious funding shortfalls that have undermined manning,
training, readiness, morale, sustainment, and modernization.
While Russia retains a relatively robust military R&D program
-- with advanced technology systems under development in many
combat areas -- funding shortfalls, a depressed defense industry,
and other domestic spending imperatives mean that few of these
systems are likely to reach full-scale production within the next
decade.
For the future, real progress at military reform will not occur
until the economy improves sufficiently, domestic spending
imperatives are satisfied, and the political and military
leadership agree on the desired size, nature, and characteristics
of the future force. In our judgment, it will take at least a
decade before these circumstances occur. Beyond that time frame,
however, the potential for Russia to reemerge as a large and
capable regional military rival of the United States increases
significantly.
Bosnia
International peacekeeping forces in Bosnia continue to operate
in a complex environment that poses significant challenges to the
establishment of a stable and enduring peace. We believe the
Bosnian factions will continue to generally comply with the
military aspects of the Dayton Accords and Stabilization Force
(SFOR) directives. We do not foresee the outbreak of widespread
fighting between the Bosnian factions over the next 18 months so
long as SFOR remains a credible military force. However, if civil
implementation of Dayton lags, the prospects for renewed fighting
would increase significantly following SFOR's withdrawal due to
the unrealized aims of the Bosnian factions. The threat to U.S.
and allied forces in SFOR from organized military forces will
remain low. Nonetheless, SFOR will continue to face a threat from
mines and various forms of low-level, sporadic and random
violence, which could include high profile attacks by rogue
elements or terrorists.
Deep mutual mistrust among Bosnia's ethnic factions and the
legacy of war have created an impetus toward de facto partition
of Bosnia. Pervasive international engagement -- both political
and economic -- will be necessary to prevent a permanent division
of Bosnia along ethnic lines.
Iraq
Iraq's military continues to suffer from the losses inflicted
during the Persian Gulf War and more than six years of UN imposed
sanctions. It has significant weaknesses in leadership, morale,
readiness, logistics, and training that limit its effectiveness
in combat against western forces. Nevertheless, Saddam has
succeeded in restoring some elements of the military -- which
remains significant by regional standards -- and retains the
capability to overwhelm Kuwait if opposed only by regional
states. Moreover, Saddam continues limited efforts to pursue WMD
and missile development programs and to conceal those activities
from UN inspection.
As long as Saddam is in power, Baghdad will retain the goal of
dominating Kuwait; therefore, Baghdad will continue to pursue
improvement of its military power and capabilities. Iraq will
remain a threat to US interests in the Gulf and to those elements
of the Iraqi population that oppose Saddam's rule. His policies
demand our continued enforcement of UN sanctions, the forward
deployment of US military power to deter or defend against Iraqi
aggression, and continued intelligence monitoring of Iraq's
military posture. While I cannot predict the nature of a
post-Saddam government with certainty, it is very likely that
Iraq will continue to maintain a strong military capability in
order to ensure its own security and survival. The key question
for the future is -- will Iraq continue its belligerence toward
the US and continue to be aggressive against Kuwait? The short
term answer is yes.
Iran
Iran's primary long-range goal is to establish itself as the
pan-Islamic leader throughout the Middle East region and beyond.
In pursuit of that goal it requires military forces that can
deter or defeat Iraq, intimidate its Gulf Arab neighbors, and
limit the regional influence of the West -- particularly the
United States. As long as Iraqi forces are constrained by UN
sanctions, Iran can afford to prioritize the development of
specific elements of its military posture. Iran recognizes that
it cannot hope to match US military power directly and therefore
continues to develop capabilities to challenge the US indirectly:
through subversion and terrorism directed against US and western
interests; the development of air, air defense, missile, mine
warfare, and naval capabilities to interdict maritime access in
the Gulf and through the Strait of Hormuz; and the pursuit of WMD
designed to deter the US and intimidate its neighbors. These
efforts reflect a clear intent to build an offensive capability
well beyond Iran's defensive needs.
Tehran's military buildup has been slowed recently by serious
economic problems and international supplier restraint (with the
notable exception of Russia, China, and North Korea). Iran's
demographic trends -- a rapidly growing and youthful population
-- do not bode well for a significant increase in military
spending. As a result, Iran's military progress will be slow but
steady, and many of its current conventional force shortcomings
-- particularly command and control, maintenance, training, and
equipment -- will linger as Tehran pursues the unconventional,
WMD, and maritime interdiction capabilities outlined above. Over
time, however, US interests will be challenged by a hegemonistic
Iran seeking to dominate the region.
South Asia
The tense rivalry between India and Pakistan is our most
important security concern on the sub-continent. While neither
side wants war, both see their security relationship in zero-sum
terms. Moreover, both possess short range ballistic missiles, can
quickly assemble nuclear weapons, and maintain large forces in
close proximity across a tense line of control. With frequent
low-level clashes, the potential for miscalculation and rapid
escalation is constant.
The South Asian drug trade presents another serious regional
concern, with many production and trafficking areas outside
effective government control. Afghanistan and Pakistan will
remain significant opium producers, with Pakistan and Iran also
serving as key drug transit nodes. Extensive governmental
corruption, other economic and political imperatives, and a
general unwillingness to focus the energy and resources required
will continue to limit the effectiveness of regional counterdrug
efforts.
Latin America
The scourge of narco-trafficking, related money laundering,
weapons and contraband smuggling, and insurgency all combine to
provide threatening conditions for the countries and governments
of the region and for US interests. The potential for more
serious insurgency and more widespread terrorism and crime in
several areas of Central and South America and the Caribbean
continues to demand our vigilance.
Future Warfare
Trends
Key trends in military technology have the potential to
dramatically alter the nature of warfare and the characteristics
of the future threat. The impact of applied automation and
computers, electromagnetic warfare, brilliant sensors, and the
other technologies listed below signal the rise of a
military-techno culture in which time, space, speed, and other
fundamental conditions are radically changed.
* Nuclearization and the proliferation of WMD
capabilities
* Precision munitions
* Electrodynamic weapons
* "Conventional" weapons of mass destruction
* Non-lethal weapons
* Information technology and cybernetic warfare
* Camouflage, cover, concealment, denial, and deception (C3D2)
* Techno-terrorism
* Nano-technologies
For the most part, however, the integrated application of these
technologies and concepts has been limited to the advanced
western militaries -- particularly the United States. One key
reason is that the elimination of Cold War threat perspectives
and the corresponding decline in global defense spending sapped
the motivation, resources, and capabilities of many nations to
pursue high technology military endeavors. Over the next decade,
however, as post Cold War defense reorganizations are completed,
defense industries stabilize, and funding (potentially)
increases, these areas are likely to see additional, albeit still
limited, emphasis. Perhaps our greatest challenge is for a rogue
nation or subnational group to acquire some key technology which
might lead to some form of strategic technical surprise.
Ground Warfare
Over the next decade, ground forces will remain the essential
means of armed combat in many regions of the world and will be
the critical force element in the conduct of military operations
of all kinds in urban environs. Key trends include: the
widespread proliferation of the best current-generation surplus
Cold War equipment; the adoption of two-tiered force structures
consisting of small, more mobile, ready components and larger,
less-ready cadre units; and an increase in the number of urban
combat deployments. For many nations, however, overall combat
effectiveness will remain limited due to persistent shortfalls in
training, maintenance, leadership, operational concepts, and
morale.
Naval Warfare
Foreign naval threats over the next decade will likely become
more diverse. Key trends include: new ship designs that emphasize
improved multi-mission capability, endurance, reduced signatures,
and increased firepower; advances in submarine quieting,
propulsion, weapons, and detection capabilities; an expansion of
mine warfare capabilities; and the continued proliferation and
development of anti-ship cruise missiles.
Air and Air Defense Warfare
Worldwide aircraft inventories will likely shrink over the next
decade as older aircraft are removed from service. Air warfare
trends include: the back-fitting of advanced weapons, sensing,
and avionics packages on 3rd and 4th generation aircraft; the
proliferation of advanced air-to-air missiles, PGMs, land-attack
cruise missiles, and "smart" weapons; the widespread
use of UAVs; and the development and fielding of more multi-role
hybrid aircraft.
The air defense threat will become more sophisticated as late
generation SAM systems are proliferated widely and systems
integration enhances overall capabilities. Key trends include:
integrated C2 systems that are better at sharing data, predictive
analysis, and speeding up sensor to shooter links; integrated
weapons platforms that combine missiles, guns, and target
detection and tracking radars; and more numerous and
sophisticated man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs) systems.
Space Warfare Trends
Over the next decade, increased foreign military space
capabilities will erode the relative advantage the US enjoys with
regard to satellite reconnaissance, communications, and
navigation. The number of countries capable of using space-based
platforms for military purposes will increase, as will the
potential for future adversaries to disrupt, degrade, or defeat
portions of the US space support system. However, the US will
remain the dominant space power.
Information Warfare
Foreign states are increasingly cognizant of the link between
automation and warfighting effectiveness and are developing a
number of offensive and defensive information warfare
capabilities. Information warfare will grow in importance and
incidence as we continue to move into the information-technology
age. Current information on vulnerabilities and foreign
intelligence initiatives in general point to the following
threats:
* trusted insiders who destroy the system from within
* sabotaging equipment during transport or storage
* network penetration and compromise
* electronic and/or physical attack
* empowered autonomous agents (cybernetic attack over time).
Conclusion
The protracted transition from the Cold War order to an uncertain
future continues with both positive and negative consequences. On
one hand, for at least the next decade, the threats facing the
United States will be of a decreased order of magnitude and we
will not likely see a global "peer competitor" within
20 years. On the other hand, the world remains a very dangerous
and complex place and there is every reason to expect US military
requirements at about the same level of the past several years:
* the explosive mix of social, demographic, and economic
conditions -- extant and through the foreseeable future -- will
mean a continued high demand for peace and humanitarian
operations. Consequently, there is likely to be a continuing
requirement for US forces to engage in these demanding
activities.
* Several key regional states -- particularly North Korea and
Iraq -- retain the capability to threaten US interests with
conventional offensives. This condition demands constant US
vigilance and the retention of demonstrable warfighting
capabilities.
* A number of transnational threats -- terrorism, weapons
proliferation, drug trafficking -- continue to plague the
international environment and threaten US citizens, forces,
property, and interests.
* Russia and China retain strategic nuclear forces capable of
threatening the US homeland. Moreover, these pivotal states are
both undergoing what are likely to be protracted, fundamental
changes with uncertain outcomes and consequences. Both have the
potential to emerge as large-scale regional threats to US
interests beyond the next decade.
* The changing nature of future warfare -- the application of new
technologies and innovative doctrinal concepts to
"conventional" military operations, and the development
of new forms of asymmetric warfare -- poses a constant challenge
to US forces.
Against this backdrop of change, turmoil, and uncertainty, the US
military provides a much needed measure of consistency. Our
national determination to remain actively engaged in the
international arena, enlarging the community of market
democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to
our nation, Allies and interests, is the single most important
factor shaping an uncertain future. We in Defense Intelligence
remain committed to providing the best possible military
intelligence support for US and Allied military forces and
decision makers engaged in that effort.
* Presented Courtesy of the Defense Intelligence Agency