ENN Exclusive Report
05/19/97 - 08:00CDT
ERRI Review/Survey of the
Quadrennial Defense Review
By C. L. Staten, Senior Analyst
Chicago, IL (ENN) The following are the results of a survey
conducted by the Emergency Response & Research Institute
(ERRI), during the period of May 11-18th, 1997. It reflects the
views of both present and retired members of all of the branches
of our nation's armed forces. Both enlisted and officer personnel
participated in the questionnaire.
The question that was asked of the service members was;
"Please list the five (5) LEAST liked or LEAST productive
items of equipment, weapons, facilities, etc. in today's
military, of which you are aware."
The results varied greatly and were in some respects both
startling and expected. The summary presents these least liked or
needed items in order of greatest mention:
* 1 - Reduce General Officers and
Staffs
Eliminate excess general officer positions and staffs, to include
those that are in excess of actual working commands. Particularly
mentioned were those in non-essential Table of Distribution and
Allowances units, staffs and directorates. Several recommended
doing away with "top-heavy units" that didn't
accomplish much but "shuffle papers."
* 2 - Stop Purchase of B-2 Bombers
Near unanimous support was voiced for discontinuing the purchase
of additional B-2 Stealth bombers. While it it would appear
unlikely that we had any B-2 pilots participating in our survey,
even several other Air force members expressed their displeasure
with the $600 million dollar cost of these planes and the lack of
a clearly defined mission for them in today's defense
environment. F-117's, on the other hand did receive the backing
of a number of respondents to our survey. Tomahawk and Cruise
Missiles were also popular with our correspondents.
* 3 - Base Closings/Consolidations
Multiple entries mentioned the need for additional base closings
in order to cut infrastructure costs and consolidate commands
into an more effective configurations. Some contributors went so
far as to offer specific examples of bases that should be closed
and offer rationales as to why.
Close: Fort McPherson, GA, Fort Carson, CO, Ft. Knox, KY,
some U.S. bases in Japan
Consolidate: Ft. Lee/Ft. Eustis/Ft. Monroe VA, Ft. Drum w/Ft.
Bragg or Ft. Benning, Ft. Richardson w/Ft. Wainwright, Alaska
It was pointed out that there are several major command
structures that exist only on paper and in an office somewhere.
They are physically in charge of no-one, except their own staff.
Although maybe historically important, they have little real
relevance in today's overall scheme of things. Centralized
computers could well maintain staffing plans, tables of
organization and equipment, and other needed contingencies should
they be needed to "ramp-up" the military in times of
crisis.
It should also be noted that few respondents believed that any
substantial number of bases would be closed, nor any major
reorganization and consolidation of commands would occur, due to
political interference in the evaluation and implementation
process. Many had difficulty in believing that members of
Congress would find it acceptable to reduce the military payroll
and workforce in their home districts.
* 4 - Combining Guard/Reserve
Units
Several suggestions recommended combining the force structure of
both air and ground national guard and reserve units into a
unified command/control structure and reducing the duplication of
facilities and staff personnel. Most did not advocate any
reduction in guard/reserve assistance to civilian disaster
preparedness/response; in fact, some suggested increasing this
civilian/military cooperative effort.
* 5 - Hospitals/Medical Care in
CONUS
Greater usage of contract civilian hospital facilities was
suggested.
A reduction in duplication/consolidation of services provided by
both Veteran's Administration hospitals and military hospitals
was also recommended. It was suggested that military doctors,
nurses and corpsmen could well be integrated into contract
civilian healthcare systems when serving in the United States,
and that armed forces personnel could be cared for in a manner
similar to other HMO, PPO, and managed care personnel. No mention
was made of changing hospital facilities in foreign countries.
* 6 - Cut Supply and Logististics
Duplications
Many supply items are duplicated in each of services, yet
independent contracts, costs, and delivery methods abound. It was
suggested that many items could be purchased jointly for all of
the services and cataloged and warehoused jointed. Individual
services could then order parts as needed from
centralized/computer controlled facilities. Greater
standardization of parts and equipment between the services could
provide for a greater economy of scale and greater
interoperability between the services. Some have even suggested
the adoption of one utility/work uniform for all of the services
to be worn by all personnel.
* 7 - Other ill-advised purchases,
according to some of our respondents;
a. "Arsenal Support Ship"
b. New submarines, beyond Seawolf
c. New Aircraft Carriers
d. Joint Strike Fighter/F-22's, etc.
In each of these cases, the respondents said that we had
sufficient forces that could be "modernized" or
"updated" to take us to the year 2005 or beyond without
danger of slipping behind our opponents. Their opinion is that
none of these items are need to maintain our world-wide military
"dominance."
* 8 - Computerization/Situational
Awareness/Information Warfare
While many of the respondents would appear to be cognizant of the
need for the development of 21st Century technology and the
assurance of "Information Dominance," most were not in
agreement as to how to accomplish this goal. One major suggestion
would seem to involve combining the Marine Sea Dragon and the
Army Force XXI programs with advanced Air Force J-Stars and other
C4I concepts. Additionally, greater computerization should make
more efficient joint command and control possible.
Another suggestion from the ranks involves the use of
computerized joint operations packages that combine the strengths
of all of the services within a unified framework that makes many
interchangeability and interoperability options more possible.
For example, a company of Marines should be interchangeable with
a company of Army infantry, depending on the mission, location,
and needs of the overall command. A platoon of air policemen
should be interchangeable for a platoon of MP's given an
appropriate mission. It shouldn't matter whether an F-16 is
labeled with an Air Force, Navy, or Marine insignia...it should
be able to conduct a strafing mission when called upon to do so.
Better connectivity and communications should make this
coordination entirely feasible.
Although a general trend towards decentralization and outsourcing
of "info-war" services to all of the branches would
seem to offer a better end product, it may be necessary, at least
for the near-term, to establish a program office
to coordinate overall computerization and situational awareness
projects at the Chairman of the Joint Chief's level of command.
* 9 - Outsourcing and Overall Cost
Reduction Programs
At least two respondents to the survey said that in an age of
computer networks and greater communications capabilities that it
is not necessary for many payroll, accounting, support, supply,
and logistics functions to even be carried out by military
personnel. With each military member comes an accumulated
schedule of pay, benefits, and allowances that may not accompany
civilian contract personnel. Additional cost savings may come
from outsourcing any/all of those tasks that do not directly
relate or contribute to the job of "warfighting."
* 10 - The Mission of the Military
So that it is not lost on you, the reader, one point came through
loud and clear in the answers to this survey. Almost to a person,
each and every respondent wanted it made clear that they view the
mission of the military as that of defending the United
States....to kill our enemies and blow up their infrastructure in
the most efficient and effective manner possible. Few
correspondents discussed with pleasure the idea that our military
services are a "global social service agency," designed
to be the world's "policeman," or "nation
builders."
Most suggested that while they understand the political reality
of "peacekeeping missions," and "constructive
engagement," that they do not believe that these tasks are
necessarily the appropriate role or mission for our Armed Forces.
Many went so far as to suggest that there would be far fewer
budget problems within the military if they were only charged
with defending the United States and her allies, rather than
undertaking so many ancillary responsibilities that could well be
seen as the purview of the State Department or the United
Nations.
* ERRI Conclusions
During our review of this complex and weighty set of issues, it
became obvious that the United States is at a pivotal point in
our defense posture for the coming millenium. Some have described
it as a "critical pause," while others view it as a
time to gather a "peace dividend" from the respite
provided by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the
end of the "Cold War." Still others see it as a time
for tremendous leaps forward in our technological defense
capabilities and an opportunity to attain "information
dominance" for the coming decade. It can be all of those
things or none of them.
What the United States is really lacking at this time is a an
honest, realistic, and productive sense of direction...a cohesive
defense policy. Without one, it is next to impossible to plan,
budget, and implement an effective national defense. In order to
develop this ideal defense strategy, some really difficult
questions must be publicly asked and answered by those we elected
to the halls of Congress and at the White House.
What are the expectations of our political leadership? What do
they expect of our military of tomorrow? Do they (and we as a
nation) really want or need an armed force that is prepared to
simultaneously conduct two (or more) major military campaigns
while carrying out multiple smaller peacekeeping, humanitarian,
and nation-building missions? And, if so, are we prepared to pay
for it? What levels of military manpower and expertise should be
devoted to domestic and international terrorism, state-less
warfare, and drug interdiction efforts?
The questions go on and on...and each must be answered to the
best of our ability. Our future collective security depends on
decisions that will be made in Washington in the next few months.
While it is the admirals and generals that will recommend our
needs for the future, and implement the resulting budget, it is
constitutionally mandated that our political leadership that must
make the hard choices about the role and direction of our armed
forces. Whether or not any of these hard choices are made remains
to be seen.
(C) EmergencyNet News Service, 1997. All rights reserved. May be
redistributed with expressed permission.
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