Date: 29 Nov 1996

Subj: Commentary on article "Emerging, Devolving, Threat..."

To: Letters to the Editor, Emergencynet News

In a recent essay on terrorism and consequence management response published by ENN, Colonel G.I. Wilson, USMC and Mr. Fred Fuller, USAJFKSWCS, FT Bragg made several observations to which I am compelled to respond. Note that this response is reflective of my opinion and judgements and does not reflect official DoD policy or position.

I. The authors suggest that terrorist acts are a "sporadic" event in today's environment:

"Let's face it - if someone seriously desired to perpetrate terrorist acts, the newspapers would be full of headlines of such horrors every day. Due care and vigilance is indeed necessary to prevent the most common acts, and alert security personnel and modern equipment and security techniques foil a significant number of would-be terrorists every year...we shouldn't go overboard on hysteria and fear mongering in the face of all this (or) the WMD threat..."

1. Colonel Wilson and Mr.Fuller may be correct regarding the fact that many non-state group events are pre-empted by robust anti-terrorist efforts, however international news media reports typically carry daily accounts of terrorist violence (or plans for such violence) in locations such as N. Ireland and the British homeland; France and Corsica; Algeria; Egypt; Pakistan; India; Sri Lanka; Israel; or Latin America. In any given week the total casualties from terrorist events exceed 100 dead or injured. On balance if they are referring solely to the U.S., one only needs to go below the "surface" of U.S. national media reporting to examine what is not typically addressed:

a. International groups such as Hamas, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, and the PIRA are generating financial reserves in the U.S. through a network of "non-profit" organizations and donations.

b. Companies such as Iran's Bonyade Mostazafan operate through a world wide network of veneers (reported to include Canada, UAE, Germany, Singapore, and NY) to acquire "restricted for Iranian import" duel use technologies, computers, and equipment to enhance programs that most certainly include terrorism.

c. Inner city "terrorism" that operates in the form of the "18th Street Gang" in L.A. (sophisticated, multi-ethnic group that includes some "cyber-talent, " operates a WEB page out of New Zealand; deals drugs and death in the City of L.A.) or El Rukns in Chicago.

d. The on-going trial of Kevin McCarthy, Peter Langan, Scott Stedeford in Des Moines, Iowa. This little group, referring to themselves as the "Aryan Republican Army," appeared to be playing out a repeat of Robert J. Mathew's "The Order" of circa 1983-84 fame, hitting at least 22 banks over a two year period. In addition they may have some interesting ties to Hayden Lakes, Idaho; Elohim City, Oklahoma; and those that bombed the McMurray building.

I recognize that I have included events commonly referred to as "criminal" acts in this discussion, however I think we all agree that a fine line exists between crime and terrorism, this line being the dilemma of the "policy-maker" who is charged with developing legislative language and laws that dictate law enforcement (state and federal) and DoD response parameters to these "criminal" or "terrorist" acts.

2. I agree with the Colonel and Mr. Murray [Fuller] that we should not inflate the terrorist threat potential U.S. citizens face, particularly the WMD variant. After all, when you examine U.S. national statistics, 38,000 people a year generally die of wounds inflicted by small arms compared to ?? that are killed in actual terrorist events involving U.S. citizens. However, unless one is prepared to go before Congress or the Executive branch and categorically state for the record that terrorist acts will not occur (WMD or otherwise) against U.S. troops, civilians, or high value assets, those charged with protecting our Nation will be told to do everything possible to minimize the potential for such events. This "demand" drives a requirement to develop and maintain both a well trained anti-terrorist (AT) capability composed of sound intelligence efforts and appropriate physical security programs; and a counter-terrorist (CT) capability composed of robust crisis/consequence management teams. Both capabilities are needed in areas where these events are likely to occur - against U.S. personnel and businesses living-operating overseas, and in our own heavily urbanized and industrialized cities which offer a plethora of "media-catching-symbolic-targets" for the non-state group to attack.

3. Despite Colonel Wilson and Mr.Fuller's accolades regarding the abilities of "small town fire departments," etc., to respond to crisis, the fact remains that there exists no standardized plan to train and equip "first responders" to resolve the consequence of even a limited scope terrorist WMD event. As a rejoinder to this comment I am aware that many States maintain quite capable hazmat response teams. The key to mitigating the effects of a terrorist (WMD) event lies in the fusion of local existing capabilities with standardized training, equipment, and C2 procedures. I know that the Federal Government is presently working on some of this through FEMA, PHS, and other agencies. However to elucidate the present problem, consider these two cases:

a. In May of 1996, Philadelphia hospitals were overwhelmed by 100+ heroin junkies who had all acquired and used a lethal combination of heroin laced with cocaine, dextromethoraphan, thiamine, and scopolamine. As reported, ER facilities at hospitals were quickly overwhelmed by these casualties, in some cases being turned away. An unsophisticated attack involving the use of a nerve agent (easily produced by those social elements that engage in the "illegal" manufacture of methamphetamine) would easily surpass the problems these hospitals "think" they experienced trying to treat these "heroin cocktail" casualties.

b. In spring of 1996, Community Hospital on Monterey, California, treated a patient who had reportedly ingested a large amount of organophosphate "bug-spray" (neuro- toxin). The fumes coming off the patient's vomitus incapacitated the ER staff attending this patient and virtually shut done the ER capability of this hospital until the facility had been decontaminated by a local hazmat team, an effort that easily took several hours. A similar case occurred in a Los Angeles hospital wherein the patient was contaminated with the chemical DMSO. In this case attending medical staff were also incapacitated by the fumes emanating from the casualty.

4. Though our "first responders" are quite capable , they still need to be adequately trained and equipped to deal with the threat of a chemical or biological "event" if a potential threat truly exists. To date only two metropolitan areas maintain such capabilities. They are Washington D.C. through the Arlington Fire Department; and Atlanta, GA. Of note, the London Telegraph recently published a report concerning the development of consequence management teams for the London subway system. The bottom line is unfortunately a tough pill to swallow: If chemicals such as G series or VX nerve agent are used in a terrorist attack, first responders have between four and forty minutes (depends on level of exposure and other factors) to start treating casualties with necessary antidotes. In a biological attack scenario, time lines for symptom onset will probably stretch out somewhat depending on the toxin/pathogen used and population exposure.

5. Unfortunately terrorist acts create (within many people) a superordinary sense of fear and vulnerability, more so than that generated by inner-city crime. I'm sure this deductive observation can be confirmed by talking to those who survived the Ethiopian 767 that ditched off of the Comoros last week (probably more accurately defined as a criminal hijacking vice terrorist incident), the casualties and kin of the Oklahoma City and World Trade Center complex bombings, and those DoD personnel that where attacked at Khobar Towers. The fact that this "security dilemma" exists in the face of statistical evidence that suggest a greater chance of dying on a metro freeway does little to appease anyone; and it is this "security dilemma" that drives the development of prescriptive measures you see today. Hopefully these measures include robust ideas and plans that will allow us to "get on the front end of the problem" in the AT arena. This will minimize the occurrence of events that require the response of consequence management assets.

6. Surely when crises response/consequence management teams have to go to work, we are already playing a game of "catch up football." Success in the AT arena lies in the development and maintenance of new ideas and cooperative efforts between local, state, federal, and international entities, particularly in areas related to intelligence sharing. Note: I am not advocating an increase in legislative mandates that restrict, minimize, or otherwise intrude on the freedoms and protection we enjoy as U.S. citizens. Draconian methods are neither required or desired. What I am suggesting is a "Revolution in AT-CT" affairs that requires an examination of how we are doing business with the multitude of assets we presently have (I am cognizant of present JCS efforts to do this from the DoD side of the house). If these things are done right, we can minimize the potential of our having to "exchange business cards" at future disasters such as the World Trade Center bombing or the Aum subway attack. In the words of General John Shalikashvili "...We are going to have to do things differently...If we miss the opportunity, nothing will happen and we will have to wait for the next Khobar Towers."

II. Colonel Wilson and Mr. Fuller suggest that:

"The stateless actors largely responsible for these threats might represent a relatively wide- spread movement with global reach and significant resources though with no single identifiable nation-state or government to support them. They might be an isolated small group with few resources save the willingness to inflict damage, injury or death in the name of a cause or for criminal gain. Witness the activities of international gangs. Finally, the threat from rogue states is onerous as well...Even so, we cannot afford to be complacent about existence of an emerging threats. Going on a permanent war footing both at home and abroad is hardly a reasonable response. Calm, cool, reasoned evaluation, threat assessment and planning are in order here"

1. Non-state actors have been engaging in terrorist violence since biblical times (yes, I recognize from an academic perspective that the "nation-state" came to be recognized as such circa 1625 with the peace of Westphalia...the term "non-state" applied to terrorist acts pre-1625 may be academically unsound). That terrorist events seem to garner more attention this year is truly a function of international balance of power adjustments adjunct to the end of the Cold War. Security dilemmas caused by the Cold War have been supplanted by those related to the affects of regional conflicts and non-state violence which includes terrorism.

2. The stateless terrorist actor is emerging as "well financed." Aum Shinrikyo is reported to have been worth $1.4 billion dollars by the time the Japanese National Police "rolled them up." Open source press accounts of Osama ibn Laden (dissident Sunni millionaire now reported to be operating with the Taliban militia in Afghanistan) suggests that he funds several radical Islamic revivalist groups. Further, circumstantial information derived from press reports and interviews with Osama indicate some connection to those that bombed: (1) the World Trade Center (1993); (2) U.S. personnel in Riyadh (November, 1995), and Dharan (Khobar Towers, summer, 1996). In a final example, the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army is said to require annual expenses of at least $12.5 million dollars (so they are able to generate at least that much per year).

3. In conclusion, if there truly exists a terrorist threat to U.S. citizens, particularly one involving the threatened use of WMD, local and state law enforcement-emergency response agencies are going to have to rely on the Federal government for funds, training, and equipment. This can certainly be accomplished without our having to "go on a permanent war-time footing." Most of those individuals who have recently attempted to characterize the nature of this threat are not suggesting that "the sky is falling," though it may if we don't engage in a few, sound, precautionary measures, measures I'm sure both the Colonel and Mr. Fuller are actively engaged in pursuing.

Sincerely,

Ken Campbell
CDR, U.S. Navy

(Editor's note: Cmdr. Campbell is an 18 year veteran of Navy UDT/SpecOps and a previous contributor to ENN. This response is in regard to Col. G.I. Wilson and Mr. Fred Fuller's article "Emerging, Devolving Threat of Terrorism," which is presented elsewhere on this site. (Click here to see the original article)