FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: 23:30CDT-07/23/96
Airport Safety and Security; "Minimal Acceptable Standards"By: Clark Staten, ERRI Senior Analyst
Chicago, IL, July 23, 1996 (ENN) -- As the evidence and bodies from TWA Flight 800 are being gathered from the ocean floor near Moriches Inlet, at least some Americans are beginning to ask realistic questions about airport/airplane safety and security. An historical analysis of the past few years and a recent spate of sometimes unexplained airplane crashes and terrorist incidents would suggest that the flying public may be in greater danger than ever before.
In order to better understand the foundations of the security systems that protect us when we fly, let's examine some preliminary observations made by the Emergency Response & Research Institute in a continuing study of American airports:
A majority of the people operating baggage screening systems in airport terminals are "contract security guards",
hired by the airport authority or airlines to conduct these essential security checks. According to industry insiders,
they have frequently received a only a minimum of training, often "on-the-job" and often taught by co-workers who's
primary qualification, to be an instructor, is that they have simply been employed longer than the trainee. Almost all of
these guards are unarmed and have no powers of arrest. Most of these guards are paid less than $10.00 an hour,
many far less. Low pay, unreasonable expectations, and "rotten working hours" are said to contribute to high
turn-over rates, assuring that few, if any, guards will have extensive experience. Demographically, most of the today's guards are entry-level youths, minorities, women, and/or retired or future law enforcement "wannabes." In fairness to the these guards, it should be noted that is generally not their fault that they haven't received enough training or education to enable them to receive better pay; if the agencies that hired them trained them to higher levels, they would be expected to give the guards pay and benefits commensurate with their advanced knowledge and abilities. Airline insiders say that airport authorities, security companies, and airlines attempt to keep security payrolls to an absolute minimum.
The x-ray equipment that they are operating may be several years old and work to varying degrees at various
airports. Reports have been received by ENN, at some airports, of guards watching "black", "white", or "snow filled"
screens that would make any sort of real detection of weapons or explosives impossible. Guards say that the federal
requirement is that the baggage be screened, not that the guards actually be able to detect dangerous items. Magnometers (metal detectors), through which passengers must walk to detect weapons and other metal objects
can be adjusted in sensitivity and are often "turned down" to avoid searching passengers, or slowing passenger flows.
Or, at times of higher alert, they are turned up to such levels of sensitivity that they detect inconsequential items like a
few coins in ones pocket or a belt buckle. Experts say that there are optimal settings for these machines, if only the
guards were properly trained to use them. Ingress and egress points (outside perimeter guard post), at many airports, are often the venue of older or
semi-retired guards. They too are often unarmed, although some may be former police officers or military men and
may be permitted (in some jurisdictions) to carry weapons. Inspections of traffic entering and leaving the cargo areas
of several airports is described by truck drivers as "sporadic", and familiar looking vehicles (Airline vehicles, Fed-Ex,
UPS, Air Cargo, catering firms, etc.) may not ever be inspected. To make matters worse, guard points are often located at ground level and very far apart. The only thing
protecting most runways, taxi-ways, cargo areas, hangers, and even terminals is a chain-link fence, regularly topped
with barbed-wire. At several airports, service and access roads wind through airports that would allow the public to
drive within 50 feet or less of active taxiways, ramp areas, or airport buildings. Security surveys at several major city
airports indicate that the easiest entrance onto airport premises would probably be by cutting though exterior
perimeter fences at night or in bad weather and then moving to the desired area(s). All-in-all, a former military special
operations Sergeant told ENN that almost all American airports would be considered easily attacked "soft-targets"
by most terrorists. Aviation experts say that the issue of screening of checked baggage must also be given additional consideration.
In the past few years, more sophisticated detection equipment has been developed that can "sniff out" explosives and
use a computer "Cat-Scan-like" technology to get an automated and far clearer picture of potential devices hidden in
checked baggage. Unfortunately, only two airports in the United States are currently using such equipment. Other
facilities are waiting for the conclusion of a federal "demonstration project" that is testing the new equipment for the
next two years. In light of recent threat levels, some experts have called for a shortening of this testing period, while
others have advocated the immediate purchase of the new technology for America's larger airports.In summary, many aviation security insiders tell ENN that security threats against airports have changed, increased in sophistication, and become more numerous, while protection methods, personnel, and (inflation corrected) budgets have remained essentially the same. While they admit that some facilities are now making use of closed-circuit television, intrusion detectors, and some other modern technology, they say that terrorists and other malcontents may have advanced their knowledge and abilities to a greater extent. Almost every aviation expert interviewed for this article predicts that unless the FAA, airports, and airlines support and actually fund additional training for security personnel and the purchase of effective security monitoring equipment, that additional tragedies can be expected in the near future.
(c) Emergencynet NEWS Service, 1996
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