Emergency Response & Research Institute (ERRI)
Effective Date: 11/19/98 - 13:00CST
Updated/Resource added: 01/06/99 - 14:00CST
Responder Safety Advisory - Response to Known/Suspected
WMD Incidents (Non-Anthrax Specific)
By C. L. Staten, ERRI Executive Director and Senior Analyst
A recent rash of anthrax "hoaxes" have occurred throughout the Mid-West,
Northeast, and Southeast. In consideration of a review of the currently available
information regarding the emergency response thereto, ERRI would like to respectfully
suggest the following generic operating procedures when responding to a threat of or to a
known or suspected incident involving "biological, chemical, or nuclear agents":
1> The
first arriving unit, be it from a police, fire, or EMS agency, should attempt to isolate
and evacuate the area where the suspected mail/package is found. Treat the area where the
mail/package is found as a "hot zone" until proved otherwise by competent
authorities. All personnel evacuated from this "hot zone" should be
decontaminated, medically evaluated, and debriefed by law enforcement authorities
before being transported to the hospital for further evaluation.
2>
Handling of mail or packages that are suspected of containing potential chemical or
biological materials should be kept to a absolute minimum. This is important from both an
evidentiary standpoint, as well as trying to reduce the number of people that are
potentially exposed to a toxic agent. This particularly true of emergency responders, who
in past incidents have reportedly handled suspect letters or showed them to other
personnel/agencies on the scene. Emergency personnel should also be cautious that the
letter/package could be "booby-trapped" or of the possibility of a secondary
explosive device in the vicinity.
3> At
the earliest opportunity, activate a response of local and/or mutual aid hazardous
materials units. Unless proven otherwise safe, personnel handling any suspected chemical,
biological, or nuclear materials should wear fully-encapsulated suits and self-contained
breathing apparatus (Level A). Institute a complete hazardous materials management plan.
Depth of resources becomes paramount in extended operations involving chem/bio
reconnaissance and decontamination, Call for help soon and request sufficient numbers of
the needed resources.
4> In
incidents involving a known or suspected "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD), it
is recommended that an early response of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) be
requested. According to the national response plan and Presidential directives, the FBI is
the lead federal agency in crisis management concerning chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons. In most jurisdictions, the FBI can be easily contacted by local police agencies.
FBI offices can also contact and activate needed federal agencies and personnel, like the
CDC, USAMIIRID, Army Technical Support Unit, National Guard RAID teams*, or Marine CBIRF,
if needed.
5> A
review of the B'nai B'rith Anthrax hoax incident that took place on April, 24, 1997 in
Washington, DC would suggest the necessity of setting up an effective
multi-jurisdictional command post to coordinate the actions of all the agencies on the
scene. Set one up at the earliest opportunity...you'll need it.
6>
Although several recent incidents, allegedly involving "anthrax," have all
proven to be hoaxes...do not become complacent or take any suspected WMD incident lightly.
Every incident must be treated as though it were the real thing until proven fraudulent.
To do otherwise could easily result in the unnecessary illness or death of citizens or
emergency responders.
7> Be
prepared for massive interest by the media. Past incidents have drawn reporters,
helicopters, and mini-cams from miles around. Institute an effective Public Information
effort early in the incident. This will help to minimize panic on the part of civilians
and be beneficial to better overall scene management activities. Particularly in urban
areas, ensure that someone contacts the FAA to "clear the airspace" over a
potential or real WMD release scene. Hovering news helicopters could rapidly spread a
chemical or biological agent to a much larger area.
8> It
should be remembered that 911 dispatchers must be involved in this entire process, as they
will take the initial reports and are in a vital position to ascertain details that will
aid investigators and/or alert responders to the possibility of a potential WMD incident.
They will also be in the midst of recording and coordinating an effective
multi-jurisdictional response to the incident. Dispatchers must be trained in WMD
recognition and be familiar with responders' objectives and responsibilities, if they are
to effectively and professionally assist in the managed command, communications, and
effective mitigation of the incident.
9> Above
all, once an incident is underway, it is far too late to formulate an effective
terrorism/WMD plan. This is a task that will require months of assessment, training,
planning, and the purchase of appropriate equipment. Obviously, a real WMD release will
quickly become a complex and difficult task involving far more than the brief
information contained herein. It is strongly recommended that awareness and
preparation for this eventuality should be underway in all communities at this time.
Update: 01/06/99 - Information Specific to Anthrax Hoaxes
Subject: Anthrax threats - USA
Suggestions to Emergency Agencies when faced with non-confirmed anthrax threats:
1. Isolate the incident site.
2. Remove potentially exposed persons to a different area. (Note: Anthrax is not a contagious disease per se and can not be transmitted from person to person, spores must be re-aerosolized to be effective)
3. Contain potentially exposed personnel. Gather personal information from each potentially explosed person, (i.e. name, address, phone number, etc). Collect oral and nasal swabs from a percentage of potentially exposed personnel.
4. Advise personnel of the signs and symptoms of Anthrax exposure and to report to a designated hospital if they have an onset of symptoms. Instruct affected personnel to go home, double bag clothes, take a hot shower using a anti-bacterial soap or .05 bleach solution, with a minimum contact (showering) time of 15 minutes.
5. Use military field Bio-Assay tickets to test for Anthrax. Fly samples and oral and nasal swabs to USARID and NMRI for conformation.
6. If field tests are negative, contact potentially exposed personnel and advise them.
7. If laboratory tests are positive, contact affected personnel and begin a treatment regime (it is recommended that treatment be begun if field bio-assay shows a positive result for anthrax).
These additional revised recommendations were developed through consultations with Major Mike Malone, Plans Officer, U.S. Marine Corps CBIRF and the Center For Disease Control in Atlanta, GA. They reflect the latest thinking concerning response to this on-going series of anthrax hoaxes. These recommendations are not applicable to responses for all potentially infectious diseases and are not a definitive policy concerning responses to a known or suspected biological release. ERRI does not give "medical advice," and this article should not be considered as such. Medical/EMS personnel should consult with their local medical authority for further direction concerning specific treatment of those exposed to biological agents.
ERRI
would like to thank the following personnel, who provided peer-review and recommendations
for these advisories:
Asst. Chief Don Hiett, Atlanta Fire Dept. (Ret.)
Dpty. Chief Paramedic Paul Maniscalco, FDNY*EMS
Bill Feinbloom, NREMT-P, Prince Georges County, MD, former U.S. Army Special Forces
Randall Larson, Senior Dispatcher, San Jose Fire Communications, Editor; 9-1-1 Magazine,
Tech Info Group Mgr, USAR CA TF-3
Deputy Larry Richards, LA County Sheriff, Emergency Operations Bureau
(* Editor's note --National Guard RAID teams are normally assets of state government and could be activated by the Governor of an individual state through the state emergency operations center. They may also be federalized by agreement between POTUS and the governor of the affected state)
© Copyright Emergency Response & Research Institute, 1998. May be republished or redistributed with permission of ERRI.
Some Related References/Additional Information
08/19/98-09:00CDT--Possible Chem/Bio Contamination Incident in Wichita. KS
06/23/98-10:30CDT-- Some Experts Fear Smaller Groups in Bio-Attack
Backgrounder on Anthrax from ERRI Infectious Disease Page
Anthrax In A Bio-war Environment
ERRI; Hazardous Materials Page
ERRI; Emergency Response to Chemical/Biological Terrorist Incidents (Lesson-On-Line)
Additional questions or comments can be directed to:
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