MILITARY CRISIS: Colombia/Venezuela and Colombia/Ecuador borders
March, 2008 -- Recent Developments and
Precipitating Factors
On 01 March, 2008, long-time FARC leader Raul Reyes (a.k.a.
Luis Edgar Devia Silva) was reported killed in a FARC
encampment that was located just inside Ecuador. The
Colombian military said the camp was located just over a mile from the
border.
A total of 17 rebels and one soldier died in the operation, which
involved Colombia's army, police and air force, Colombian defense minister
Juan Manuel Santos said.
Colombian officials have long complained that FARC rebels are allowed to
take refuge across its borders in both Ecuador and Venezuela. Colombia said
after the assault that FARC "terrorists" including Reyes "have had the
custom of killing in Colombia and taking refuge in the territory of
neighboring countries."
Shortly after the raid by the Colombian military, tensions began to rise
as both Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa and Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez began diplomatic protests and then sent their troops to the border
with Colombia. The situation and rhetoric have continued to escalate since
then...
a.k.a. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
Description
Established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian
Communist Party, the FARC is Latin America’s oldest, largest, most capable,
and best-equipped insurgency of Marxist origin, although it only nominally
fights in support of Marxist goals today. The FARC is governed by a general
secretariat led by long-time leader Manuel Marulanda (a.k.a. “Tirofijo”) and
six others, including senior military commander Jorge Briceno (a.k.a. “Mono
Jojoy”). The FARC is organized along military lines but includes some
specialized urban fighting units. A Colombian military offensive targeting
FARC fighters in their former safe haven in southern Colombia has
experienced some success, with several FARC mid-level leaders killed or
captured. France, Spain, and Switzerland formed an international commission
in November 2005 to aid the Colombian Government and the FARC with
humanitarian exchange negotiations.
Activities
FARC has carried out bombings, murder, mortar attacks,
kidnapping, extortion, and hijacking, as well as guerrilla and conventional
military action against Colombian political, military, and economic targets.
The FARC murdered a U.S. citizen and a Colombian soldier and continues to
hold three other U.S. citizens kidnapped in February 2003 when their plane
crashed in a FARC stronghold. Foreign citizens often are targets of
abuductions that FARC carries out in pursuit of ransom and political
leverage. The FARC has well-documented ties to the full range of narcotics
trafficking activities, including taxation, cultivation, and distribution.
Strength
Approximately 12,000 combatants and several thousand more
supporters, mostly in rural areas.
Location/Area of Operation
Primarily in Colombia with some activities such as
extortion, kidnapping, weapons sourcing, logistics, and R&R in neighboring
countries.
External Aid
Cuba provides some medical care, safe haven, and political
consultation. The FARC often uses the Colombia/Venezuela and
Colombia/Ecuador border
-- Source: United States Department of State, Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2005,"
Issued: April 2006
COLOMBIA
Under President Uribe, Colombia—the United States’staunchest ally in the
region—has continued to make major progress in strengthening democracy by
improving security while energetically implementing a comprehensive
counternarcotics strategy.
Colombia’s better-trained security forces and improving counterinsurgency
capabilities have significantly weakened the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), confining the group’s operations largely to ambushes and
harassment attacks. This is a major difference from the late 1990s when the
FARC regularly assaulted rural police garrisons and even battalion-sized
Army units. Bogota now holds the strategic advantage because of the
military’s sustained combat operations in the FARC’s rural heartland and the
permanent stationing of security forces in regions previously dominated by
the insurgents. Key successes last year included the killing of two
prominent FARC Front commanders and the continuing high number of FARC
deserters.
FARC leaders increasingly rely on political tactics to try to distract or
restrain the government. The group’s recent release of two Colombian
hostages was a bid by the FARC to gain international recognition and
pressure the government into offering it a demilitarized zone. The Uribe
government continues to work with the United States to secure the freedom of
three US hostages, who have been held captive for nearly five years. The
FARC currently holds about 750 hostages.
The second major prong of Uribe’s security strategy -- demobilizing and
reintegrating paramilitaries into civilian society -- also has yielded
important benefits. Government successes against all the illegal armed
groups have caused murder and kidnapping rates to drop significantly, and
the improved security environment has helped fuel an economic boom.
Stepped-up efforts to prosecute human rights violators, including in the
security services, have contributed to a gradually improving human rights
picture. Bogota is taking steps to follow through with proposals to
strengthen the judiciary and prosecute the murders of union members and
human rights workers.
Bogota’s counterdrug program continues to show impressive results,
particularly in interdiction, arrests of major drug traffickers, and
extradition. The police and military seized 65 metric tons of cocaine and
cocaine base in 2006; it also destroyed 200 cocaine labs. The government has
approved more than 550 extraditions to the United States since 2002,
including more than 100 cases in 2007. And Colombian authorities captured
kingpin Diego Montoya in September, the country’s most important drug
trafficker on the FBI’s Top Ten list. Although aggressive US-supported
aerial eradication has diminished coca cultivation in some areas, coca
farmers have adapted by moving beyond the reach of the spray program or
taking actions to save or replace sprayed fields. In response, the Uribe
administration is combining spray efforts with increased emphasis on manual
eradication.
-- Source:
Annual Threat
Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, 5 February 2008, By J. Michael McConnell,
Director of National Intelligence
Emergency Response & Research Institute (ERRI)
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