Urban Warfare Considerations; Understanding and Combating Irregular and Guerilla Forces During A "Conventional War" In Iraq

By C. L. Staten, Sr. National Security Analyst
Emergency Response & Research Institute
Chicago, IL
 

"The worst policy is to attack cities...Attack cities only when there is no alternative."
Sun Tzu: Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pg. 78.

It should be noted that U.S. Secretary of State Powell told the U.N. Security Council on 05 Feb 2003, "Iraq harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi, a Jordanian, is believed involved in the development of chemical/biological/nuclear weapons (WMD) for the al-Qaeda organization.

Additionally, it is believed that the Iraqi troops are also incorporating battle planning information that was obtained in urban warfare in Gronzy. Chechnya ₍₄₎ , Jenin, West Bank ₍₅₎, and Mogudishu, Somalia ₍₆₎. In these battles, irregular forces were able to inflict disproportionate casualties on regular army troops by using asymmetric strategies. Ever since Stalingrad, battles have shown that a competent and motivated defender can take advantage of his knowledge of the ground and the fact that cities force short-range combat under such conditions, to inflict major casualties on the enemy. The overall effectiveness of Iraqi irregular combat operations, however, remains to be determined.

Urban operations will wear many faces in the Iraqi conflict, and particularly in future wars. Some will look like traditional peacekeeping operations, some the peace enforcement operations that currently command our attention, some the epic urban combat of such struggles as the Battle for Stalingrad. General Charles Krulak has described the landscape of future urban operations as a "three block war." According to Krulak's depiction of the urban battle-space, we can expect to be providing humanitarian assistance in one part of the city, conducting peacekeeping operations in another, and fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle in yet a third part of the city.₍₇₎

Consideration of Strategic Circumstances in Iraq

The presence of sizeable US ground forces would make a decisive contribution to military success in combat in Iraq. Iraqi units might move against Saddam if they saw a massive army advancing towards them - many commanders are loyal to Saddam, but -- only out of fear for their lives. But, mass Iraqi defections cannot be assumed, and other factors warrant serious consideration.

First, despite degradation, Iraqi forces have an urban warfare capability and it can be assumed that if US forces assembled over a period of months, cities would be 'prepared' for urban combat. Much heavy equipment is in poor repair, but the weapons needed for urban combat - shoulder-launched SAMs, anti-tank weapons, automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, explosives and mines - are all in ample supply with Iraqi conventional forces.

Second, the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard are more loyal to Saddam than forces of regular army units containing conscripts. It would be extremely imprudent to assume that 100,000 hard-core fighters would not oppose US-led coalition forces inside Iraq's cities. Washington should attain parity in its order of battle. More than 100,000 US troops would thus be required, while an invasion and occupation force of 200,000 would be ideal.

Third, recent experience in urban combat points to the likelihood of one US loss for every 5-20 opposition losses. If Iraq were prepared to endure 20,000 casualties, the US could also suffer thousands (with roughly 20% fatalities). The risks in assuming easy victory, only to be proved wrong, would be quite high.

The Iraqi targets of greatest interest to US forces would include command/control and leadership targets, what remains of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program and other WMD capabilities. If these could be neutralized, the war could potentially be won quickly, since toppling Saddam and depriving Iraq of WMD is of more importance to the US than completely destroying Iraq's military.

However, it has to be assumed that some Command/Control targets could survive attacks; that the US would not quickly learn the whereabouts of WMD targets; and that Saddam could evade capture or remain within a protective cordon formed by his elite Republican Guard and bodyguard troops. Under these circumstances, one has to assume that the US would have to attrite or force the surrender of the bulk of Iraq's armed forces, and particularly the Republican Guards and Special Republican Guards.

Mao: Cooperation Between Orthodox and Guerilla Armies

Theorists believed that guerilla warfare was either obsolete and that the only way one could achieve victory was by fighting with a conventional army; or that it was the only way that one could obtain victory in certain situations. Mao Tse Tung devised a cooperation between the orthodox and guerilla armies, taking the advantages that each form of war had. We can expect Saddam Hussein, who has studied and desires to emulate China's Mao and Russia's Stalin, to undertake similar strategies.

As the war went on, Mao gained more and more power, hence he had more and more resources at his disposition, which meant that he could form his own more orthodox army. He noticed that depending on the situation, the orthodox army or the guerilla army could be much more effective. Moreover, he discovered that in some situations, neither types of armies had an advantage over the other. For example, in a marsh that is situated in a wide open space, both types of armies would have equally some advantages and disadvantages.

Mao came up with three types of cooperation between the orthodox and guerilla armies:

1.Strategical cooperation: The guerilla army would prepare the terrain for the orthodox army by harass the enemy and weakening its rear areas.

2. Tactical cooperation: The guerilla army will gather information for the orthodox army and disrupt the communication lines and transportation paths of the enemy. The guerilla bands are best suited for these types of operation as they are much more mobile and quick largely due to their smaller size. Moreover, the guerilla army will convert the enemy’s rear into an additional front which will be of great help for the orthodox army. All this will demoralize the enemy giving a psychological advantage to the rebels.

3. Battle cooperation: This is simply when the orthodox and guerilla armies fight side by side (Likely Iraqi Option)

This type of cooperation required constant communication between both armies since the guerilla army could transform itself into an orthodox army and vice-versa, depending on the situation. Mao knew that as the war went on he would be eventually able to build an orthodox army. However, he also acknowledged the fact that the territory on which they were fighting on was propitious for guerilla type warfare; thus he meshed the two types of warfare together in order to get the maximum efficiency out of his armies. Mao sought to adapt the type of army he would use to the situation that presented itself on the battlefield. It is likely that the Iraqis will use an adaptive strategy in any conflict with U.S. and coalition forces.

Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

This style of warfare was based on the trends identified in the earlier generational shifts. They believe that future war would be characterized by: very small independent action forces (SIAF) or cells acting on mission-type orders; a decreased dependence on logistics support; more emphasis on maneuver; and psychological goals rather than physical ones. This latter objective of psychological warfare meant that the enemy’s will to fight had to collapse from within.

Wilson, et al, posed that the “idea-based fourth generation may be visible in terrorism”. They did not propose that terrorism was the fourth generation, but rather, they suggested that terrorism would take advantage of fourth generation warfare.

Finally, the authors identified three basic constructs of 4GW:

(1) the loss of the nation state’s monopoly on war,
(2) a return to a world of cultures and states in conflict, and
(3) internal segmentation/division along ethnic, religious, and special interests lines within our own society.

In a set of chilling predictions, the authors suggested that in fourth generation warfare:

(1) There will be a shift in focus from the enemy’s front to his rear;
(2) The practitioners of 4GW would seek to use the enemy’s strength against him;
(3) They would use freedom’s openness against itself; and finally,
(4) The 4GW force would not need a lot of money to wage fourth generation warfare.₍₈₎

Characteristics of 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) and Situation in Iraq Today

According to Wilson, et al, So the war has taken on a blurry admixture of strategy, operations, and tactics in fourth generation setting.

· An elusive enemy who doesn’t fight “fair”

· Difficult terrain

· Uncertain allies

· Problematic identification of friend from foe

· Experienced and hardened enemy fighters

· Underground enemy ₍₉₎

Typical Tactics of Urban Guerillas and Practice of 4th Generation Warfare (4GW)

The urban insurgent works alone or in small cells.

a. Disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage.
b. Generating widespread disturbances designed to stress the resources of the opposing force.
c. Creating incidents or massing crowds to lure the opposition force into a trap.
d. Provoking the opposing force into overreacting, which would provide hostile propaganda.
e. Provoking inter-factional strife.
f. Sniping at roadblocks, outposts, sentries, and individuals.
g. Attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars.
h. Planting explosive devices, either against specific targets or at random, to cause confusion and destruction, and to lower public morale.
i. Ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters.

Tactical/Technical Lessons/Considerations in Urban and 4th Generation Warfare:

* Rigorous communications security is essential, even against relatively primitive enemies.

* Night operations are especially difficult to carry out in an urban environment.

* Tanks and armored personnel carriers cannot operate in cities without extensive dismounted infantry support.

* Trained snipers are very cost effective, but likely to be in short supply.

* If patrolling is central to the strategy of the security forces, it will be different from conventional combat patrolling and must be well coordinated.

* Fratricide is a serious problem when fighting in cities because it is harder to identify friend from foe.

* Major civilian structures in cities (e.g., hospitals, churches, banks, embassies) are cited in such a way as to be tactically useful locations, command key intersections, and/or are built of especially solid construction. Therefore, such facilities are especially useful to urban defenders. We have already seen examples of Iraqi usage of a hospital as a staging area and for the storage of WMD protection equipment.

* Direct-fire artillery and anti-aircraft artillery can be a valuable tool in urban combat, provided one does not care about collateral damage. Unfortunately, "collateral damage" will be used in Iraqi propaganda

* Small unit leadership, especially at the junior non-commissioned officer level, is critical to tactical success in urban operations.

* Recovering damaged armored vehicles is more difficult in urban areas.

* Intelligence, especially from human sources, is absolutely critical to successful urban operations.

* Hit-and-run ambushes by small groups are the favorite tactic of urban paramilitary forces. We have already seen such tactics in Iraq.

* Tracked vehicles are preferable to wheeled vehicles in situations where there is likely to be large amounts of rubble in the streets. Otherwise wheeled armored vehicles are faster and preferable.

* Helicopters have extreme difficulties operating in an urban combat environment (See BlackHawk Down in Somalia), but are quite useful in redeploying forces and supplies to just behind the forward edge of operations.

* The Soldier's equipment load must be dramatically reduced because urban warfare requires greater individual agility and stamina. Special emphasis must be given to ammunition loads, medical supplies, and water.

* Small arms, though not usually decisive in large battles, play a disproportionately significant role in the outcome of urban battles.

* Individual flak jackets significantly reduce urban casualties.

* Smoke enhances survivability in urban situations, but carries significant operational penalties (e.g., impedes visual communications, taxes driving skills of vehicle operators, and slows the overall rate of advance).

* Mortars are highly regarded by both attackers and defenders in urban operations, but may be less effective than supposed.

* Machine-guns may be more valuable than assault rifles for urban combat.

* Air defense guns are valuable for suppressing ground targets.

* Heavy machine-guns still offer good defense against close air attack, especially helicopters.

* Rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) are omnipresent and very effective weapons in urban combat. We can expect extensive use of RPG's by irregular Iraqi forces.

* Armored vehicles require more protection when operating in cities and that protection needs to be distributed differently than for conventional battlefield.

* Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) can provide real-time intelligence, but analysts have considerable difficulty interpreting it correctly.

* The enemy often employs home-made weapons, even including chemical weapons, against security forces.

* Lightly protected armored vehicles are of limited value in heavy urban terrain.

* Combat engineering equipment, especially armored bulldozers, are critical assets in urban combat.

* Cluster munitions are very effective in cities, provided one is not concerned about collateral damage. (See previous note on the use of collateral damage as an enemy propaganda tool)

* Although available, artillery-fired precision-guided munitions (PGMs) were seldom used in urban operations.

* “Bunker busting” weapons can be invaluable for urban warfare.

Psychological Implications and Operations - 4GW and Asymmetric Warfare

In the Post-Cold-War era, our enemies, including Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, Fidel Castro in Cuba, Yasar Arafat of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and any number of others have discovered that they can win the "hearts and minds" of the world's people through the selected use of real information, disinformation, manipulation of the press, propaganda, and other psychological (Psy-Ops) warfare methods.

In fact, some would even go so far as to suggest that Mr. Hussein actually won the latest stand-off with the United States (early 1998), over Chemical/biological Weapons and inspections of his palaces, as he was able to manipulate public opinion in the United States and elsewhere and split the former allied Persian Gulf coalition.

With assistance of diplomats from a number of Arab countries, Russia, and France, all of whom have a vested economic interest in ending United Nations sanctions against Iraq, Hussein was able to both prevent the bombing of his country and be authorized by the U.S. to sell even more petroleum, ostensibly to buy food and medicine for the Iraqi people. A historical perspective might suggest, however, that such programs and funds have probably enabled Iraq to rebuild presidential palaces and maintain key weapons and military assets.

It is believed by ERRI analysts that such psy-ops and propaganda programs will continue to have an increasingly more influential impact on future conflicts, and that our military and political leadership should seriously consider expanding efforts by U.S. psychological warfare operations and units to counter these developments. ₍₁₀₎

Recommendations and Suggestions:

- The problem of Urban Warfare is one of vertical envelopment, rather than horizontal. It requires tactical thinking in three dimensions. Units must maintain "spherical" security at all times. The compartmented, three-dimensional nature of the urban battle places a premium on all around security. Units that do not heed this stricture often find themselves attacked from the rear or from above.

- Tanks and infantry working as an integrated team may prove especially effective. The tank improves success in meeting engagements, countering ambushes, and in maintaining momentum during fire and maneuver.

- Thermal sights and night vision devices can be a force multiplier. During training experimentation, the thermal sights on the tank and the LAV were used effectively to locate enemy units hiding in buildings.

- Lack of an urban ground reconnaissance capability greatly inhibits aggressive maneuver and may increase casulties. The overall lack of intelligence gathering capability and HUMINT (human intelligence) in urban areas is a serious U.S. deficiency that must be corrected at the earliest opportunity.

- All movement, including infantry alone, must use "bounding and over-watch" techniques. During movement in open areas, units using bounding and over-watch have significantly reduced casualties compared to units that did not.

- The restricted and compartmented nature of the urban battle-space makes it difficult to gain and maintain situational awareness. Even small unit leaders must learn to quickly recognize and utilize key terrain in the urban environment. They must learn how to determine which buildings or facilities will give them a tactical advantage. This includes such things as tall buildings for observation, command and control, and fields of fire. ₍₁₁₎

References:

(1) "Declaration of Jihad," "Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants," Available on the internet at: http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm

(2) "Iraqis deceive Marines at Nasiriyah," Sanders, K. MSNBC, Available on the internet at:: http://www.msnbc.com/news/890065.asp

(3) FBI Most Wanted Poster: Available on internet at: http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/teraladel.htm

(4) The Battle(s) of Grozny, by Ib Faurby, Royal Danish Defence College, available on the internet at: http://www.caucasus.dk/publication1.htm

(5) The Second Intifada and the Lessons of Jenin Dealing with the Grim Realities of Urban Warfare, by Cordesman, A., Center for Strategic and International Studies, available on the internet at: http://www.csis.org/features/second_jenin.pdf

(6) "Task Force Ranger: A Case Study Examining the Application of Advanced Technologies in Modern Urban Warfare," Akers, F., for DOE, prepared by NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM OFFICE, Y-12 NATIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX, OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE 37831-8260, Available on the internet at: http://www.at.y12.doe.gov/ranger.pdf

(7) 2. Charles C. Krulak, "The Three Block War: Fighting In Urban Areas," presented at National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 10 October 1997, Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 December 1997, p. 139.

(8) 5 May 2002 -“Military Response to Fourth Generation Warfare in Afghanistan,” By Wilcox, G. and Wilson, G.I., Available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/2002/4gw5may02.htm

(9) ibid.

(10) 04/27/98. Asymmetric Warfare, the Evolution and Devolution of Terrorism; The Coming Challenge For Emergency and National Security Forces By: Staten, C. L. ERRI,  Available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/asymetrc.htm

(11) "Training for Urban Operations In the 21st Century," by Gangle, R. Col., Marine Corps Gazette - July 2001, available on the internet at: http://www.urbanoperations.com/training2.htm

Additional Reference:

"Military Operations on Urban Terrain [MOUT]," by Global Security.org, available on the internet at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/mout.htm  - With numerous other useful links

The Urban Operations Journal - MOUT/FIBUA - Small Wars - Cultural Intelligence: available on the internet at:
http://www.urbanoperations.com/

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Briefing: Conflict
With Iraq - 2003 (Continuing coverage)

April 8, 2002: Change in Terrorism Tactics Reported; Suicide Bombers Could Have Major Implications