Special Report: 16 August 2002

9/11: Bush's Fault, Clinton's Fault? -- Or An Institutional Failure For Many Years?

Opinion/Editorial

By C. L. Staten, ERRI Sr. National Security Analyst

New York, NY (EmergencyNet News) -- Stories are circulating throughout the media, with blaring headlines implying that President George W. Bush "dropped the ball" in regard to the Al-Qaeda terrorist group prior to September 11th, 2001. But should the blame be directed more towards the actions of the government bureaucracy? Time Magazine explored the issue in depth in this week's edition ^(1).

The most recent allegations center on Richard Clarke, a career bureaucrat who had risen during the Clinton years to become the White House's point man on terrorism, and Clinton's National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger. According to Time magazine, both men say that they made an extensive effort to warning incoming Bush administration officials about "escalating threats" from Al-Qaeda and other like-minded radical organizations. But, Time alleges that the Bush administration did not consider terrorism "on their plate of key issues."⁽²⁾

The historical record, as outlined by Time magazine, would suggest that the problem of terrorism was one that was all but ignored during the Clinton years. A quick review of incidents would reveal that:

A. In 1993, the World Trade Center had been bombed for the first time.⁽³⁾

B. In 1996, 19 American servicemen had been killed when the Khobar Towers, in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, was bombed. ⁽⁴⁾

C. Two years later, American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were attacked. ⁽⁵⁾⁽⁶⁾

D. As the millennium celebrations at the end of 1999 approached, the CIA warned that it expected five to 15 attacks against American targets over the New Year's weekend. Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian based in Montreal, was stopped at a border crossing from Canada while carrying explosives intended for an attack on the Los Angeles International Airport. Other arrests in Jordan and elsewhere prevented other attacks.⁽⁷⁾

E. In October, 2000, The destroyer USS Cole was in port at Aden, Yemen, for refueling when it was rammed and an explosion blew a large hole in her side.⁽⁸⁾

And, not mentioned in the Times article, but of major significance in the overall scheme of things regarding terrorism, was the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia following the 1993 "Blackhawk Down" incident. No less than Usama Bin Laden, himself, said that the rapid departure of U.S. forces from Somalia was a major motivating factor in his belief that the U.S. would flee if faced with casualties. Many analysts believe that this perception on Bin Laden's part probably contributed to further terrorist attacks.

In response, the only counter-measure that the U.S. took during the entire Clinton administration was a limited cruise-missile strike on Afghanistan ⁽⁹⁾, which most experts agree had very little effect on deterring Bin Laden or dismantling his operations. In fact, it may have served to increase the militant's anger and motivate further attacks.

All of that said, however, it would be the considered opinion of this author that the fault probably does not lie in the executive office of the president, or within the National Security Council, of either administration. While any political administration must bear the responsibility for anything that happens during "their watch," they also act, or fail to act, based on the information and perspective that is provided by those beneath them in the chain-of-command.

The real fault more likely lies within a institutional mindset and actions of the government bureaucracy that actually runs all administrations. It is an vast infrastructure of under-secretaries, assistant secretaries, assistant to the assistant secretaries, directors, contractors, consultants, and career-service employees of various pay-grades who help shape the U.S. government (USG) policy on almost everything.

In the case of the USG reaction to Al-Qaeda, it is believed that during the 1980-90's there were any number of agency and corporate agendas in Washington that had little to do with the emerging terrorism threat. Administration policies, during the 90's, also repeatedly involved attempting to attain accommodation and rapprochement with radical regimes' such as Iran and other countries classified by some as "rogue nations." ^(10)(11) In a manner similar to Britain's Chamberlain during World War II, an examination of the facts would suggest that a number of people in the U.S. foreign policy establishment during the 90's thought that "appeasement" and "check-book diplomacy" were the answer to a rising and radical Muslim insurgency. Events would suggest that their solutions were inadequate to the task.

Secondarily, it is believed that a good number of officials in the intelligence, military, and law enforcement community were actually suffering from a "state of denial" concerning the potential threat from terrorist organizations. Indicative of the view within parts of "the official establishment in Washington" was an Op/Ed piece in the New York Times from a former State Department counterterrorism specialist who went so far as to say, "Americans seem to believe that terrorism is the greatest threat to the United States and that it is becoming more widespread and lethal. They are likely to think that the United States is the most popular target of terrorists. And they almost certainly have the impression that extremist Islamic groups cause most terrorism. History would suggest that none of these beliefs are based in fact."⁽¹²⁾

The U.S. State Department, itself, reflected this belief that terrorism was "under control" in it's April 30, 2001 report -- Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2000, Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism -- said "While the threat continues, 2000 saw the international community's commitment to counterterrorism cooperation and ability to mobilize its resources grow stronger than ever. As a result, state-sponsored terrorism has continued to decline, international isolation of terrorist groups and countries has increased, and terrorists are being brought to justice."⁽¹³⁾

Additionally, any number of present or former members of the intelligence community speak about a "risk-adverse" and "zero casualty" mentality that developed during the 90's. Several experts, including former CIA operative Robert Baer, charge that the CIA and other agencies essentially "withdrew" from conflict with Al-Qaeda and other militant Islamic organizations. Further, Baer alleges that Washington politics sabotaged CIA efforts to root out terrorists.⁽¹⁴⁾ That mentality must change, in the opinion of this author, if we are to hope to be successful in combating the world-wide terrorist insurgency.

Thirdly, it would appear that alleged corporate greed wasn't limited to Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia or other reportedly failed corporate citizens. As the threat from the former Soviet Union declined and as at least one faction of the Clinton administration tried to convert military spending into a "peace dividend," defense contractors began to look for another source of USG funding. The issue that was seized upon as the next profit center was "missile defense," which emerged as a potential windfall for contractors and lobbyists. It involved any number of "big ticket" research and development projects that could quickly absorb those dollars that were still flowing from Washington.

Additionally, any number of technologies and other weapon systems -- proceeded during the 90's, seemingly without interruption, and even though they had little or no bearing or effect on low intensity warfare or combating terrorism. Not surprisingly, these weapons systems were also not designed to be rapidly deployed to trouble areas, nor readily
air transportable. In at least some military circles, instead of providing relevant training, equipment, and adequate pay and benefits for the troops, the concept of more buying more expensive "heavy iron" and dubious anti-missile systems seemed to prevail. In light of 9/11, one would think that civic responsibility would outweigh corporate profits...but, apparently that has not been the case with some defense contractors and lobbyists.

In political fairness to the Clinton administration, a review of this issue would reveal that this expensive fascination with a military "dominance of space" and of buying weapons systems that are difficult to deploy, also continued during the first months of the Bush administration. Most government contractors apparently could not see many profits forthcoming from a potential "war on terrorism." Therefore, it would appear that the "military-industrial complex"⁽¹⁵⁾ decided that they would put their lobbying power into publicly diminishing the threat of terrorism and accentuating the possibility of an ICBM attack from a third world power.⁽¹⁶⁾

Fourth, as both congressional and media investigation of U.S. intelligence and domestic counter-terrorism preparedness programs are now revealing, there were a multitude of problems concerning interoperability, communications, cooperation, "turf-battles," and a lack of information sharing within the USG.^(17)(18) Allegations have arisen from several quarters that too many "fiefdoms" existed in too many USG agencies...allegedly resulting in roadblocks that prevented interagency cooperation.

According to those who analyze such things, "the right hand didn't know what the left hand knew," allegedly resulting in a failure to "connect the dots" involving various bits of information that could have forewarned America about Bin laden and Al-Qaeda. Effectively, prior to 09/11, there was no common goal or focused effort to battle terrorism in all of the associated agencies of the USG. Hopefully, this is a problem that President Bush's proposed Homeland Defense cabinet agency is being designed to address

In other words, a number of converging problems and reasons prevented the United States from interdicting terrorist attacks of the magnitude that occurred on September 11. 2001.⁽¹⁹⁾ One overriding fact remains...one can safely assume that there is more than enough blame to share in any number of official agencies, who refused to believe that what they perceived as a "bunch of rag-tag militants living in a cave in Afghanistan" could perpetrate the kind of devastation that occurred on 9/11 in New York City and Washington, DC.

Another thing remains certain, regardless of which political party is in power in Washington, their primary responsibility must be the defense of the American homeland. There must be an immediate enlightenment within the beltway that the threats facing our country are not those of the 20th century and that they will continue to evolve in an asymmetrical way and at the whim of our enemies. The main challenge that faces our nation involves facilitating the capability for our nation's defense, intelligence, and emergency service agencies to recognize, improvise, and adapt to this changing threat environment at a more rapid rate than our adversaries can generate their evolution.

References:

1. "Could 9/11 Have Been Prevented?" -- Time Magazine, Aug 12, 2002, Vol. 160, No. 7, Pgs. 29-42. Also available in summary on the internet at: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,333835,00.html

2. ibid, Time Magazine

3. "Terrorist Bomb Rocks World Trade Center, Seven (7) Dead, 650 Injured," by Anderson, P., EmergencyNet News Special Report, 02/26/93-20:00CST -- Available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/wtc_0293.htm

4. "06/26/96: Terrorist Devastates USAF Base in Dhahran; 23 Dead, 105 Critically Injured," Available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/saudibm2.htm

5. "SEARCH FOR EMBASSY BOMBERS BEGINS," Available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/afribomb.htm

6. "Update/Series of Reports; Bombings of Two U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Africa -10 Aug 98," available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/afribmb2.htm

7. "The Emergency Response & Research Institute Year2000(Y2K) Resource Page," with additional references, and available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/y2kpage.htm

8. "U.S. Navy Ship Rammed In Aden, Yemen; Explosion Follows," found on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/2000/usscole-bomb.htm

9. "Series of EmergencyNet News Reports; U.S. Strikes on Terrorists (Osama bin Laden Organization) in Sudan and Afghanistan - 20 Aug 98 to 24 Aug 98," available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/afgnstrk.htm

10. "February 18, 2000: U.S. betting on major changes after election in Iran," available on the internet at:
http://worldtribune.com/worldtribune/Archive-2000/ss-iran-02-18.html

11. "Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy; Clinton Administration," available on the internet at:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/clinton.htm

12. "The Declining Terrorist Threat," By Larry C. Johnson, New York Times [op.ed.] July 10, 2001 (may require registration and payment of a fee)

13. "2000; Patterns of Global Terrorism," April 30, 2001, U.S. Department of State, available on the internet at:
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/

14. "See No Evil; The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism," Baer, R., Crown Publishing, 2002, ISBN 0-609-60987-4.

15. "Military-Industrial Complex" Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960, p. 1035- 1040; Available on the internet at: http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/indust.html

16. "National Missile Defense (NMD) program," resource page by the Federation of American Scientists, available at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/nmd/index.html

17. "February 21, 2002: U.S. Intelligence Didn't Catch 9/11 Clues?" available on the internet at:
http://www.emergency.com/2002/intel_11Sep01.htm

18. "April 9, 1997: Strategic Knowledge; Preventing the Bombing of the Bridge to the 21st Century," available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/stratknw.htm

19. "Series of EmergencyNet News "Real-Time" Reports Concerning Multiple Plane Hijackings & Terrorist Attacks in New York City and Washington, DC: 11-17 Sep 2001," two parts, available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/2001/11sep01-terror1.htm.