Rules of Engagement; The Reality, not the movie...
By C. L. Staten, Sr. National Security Analyst
Emergency Response & Research Institute
Chicago, IL (EmergencyNet News) -- The recent bombing of the U.S.S.
Cole in Aden, Yemen (1) has raised the issue of
whether or not current methods for establishing military and law enforcement
"Rules of Engagements" (ROE) are effective. A movie by the same name vividly
pointed out the problem and also sparked interest in this topic earlier this
year.(2) The problem was previously pointed out in the Jefferson County Sheriff’s office report on the 20 April 1999 shooting at Columbine High School was released to the public. Copies of it are available on the World-Wide-Web at several locations. (3)
A preliminary review of this report would seem to confirm a hypothesis that analysts at the Emergency Response & Research Institute (ERRI) have been working on since before the Columbine shooting -- emergency service agencies all over the world are facing a problem that has not been previously anticipated -- namely, emerging "ultra-violence"(4) and tactical situations that are changing too fast for existing emergency management systems and law enforcement "rules of engagement" (ROE) to be effective.
The issue first became all too evident to ERRI analysts as the events of a failed robbery at the North Hollywood branch of the Bank of America unfolded in California in 1997.(5) During that incident, two heavily armed gunmen -- covered from head to foot in body armor -- wounded at least 17 people and terrorized a neighborhood.
Since then, with crime in general declining (6), several countries have experienced horrifying multiple shooting incidents at schools workplaces, and other locations (7). Each of these incidents has been has been reviewed by ERRI, the International Assn. of Chiefs of Police (8) and a number of other law enforcement organizations.
Similarities Between Civilian Law Enforcement and Military Rules of Engagement
The problem of "applying deadly force" is not unique to law enforcement; it is one that also plagues military forces (9)(10) in what are often called OOTW (Operations Other Than War). In fact, many of the principals and precepts of military practice may form the basis for law enforcement personnel in future ultra-violent episodes in urban areas -- and vice-versa. In other words, military and law enforcement policies are likely to become more common and analogous as the nature of these incidents intensifies.
LTC Geoffrey Demarest, U.S. Army, observes, "However, lacking a uniformed enemy, ROE will almost inevitably tend toward the pattern of instructions extant in police departments in the United States. These police rules were not developed in a legal vacuum. They are the product of case and statutory law, criminal and civil, which over time have come to reflect the expectations of the citizenry regarding government use of force."(11)
Brigadier Gavin Bulloch (British Army, Ret.), goes even further and suggests that, "Commanders should seek 'soft' methods of destroying the enemy; by arrest, physical isolation, or subversion, for example. The use of the minimum necessary force is a well-proven counterinsurgency lesson."(12) In other words, while engaging in OOTW, military personnel may increasingly find themselves engaging what appear to be "law enforcement duties" -- actually, in furtherance of larger counterinsurgency goals.
The Crux of the Problem
In reviewing the problem, our primary concern involves the fact that it would appear that devastating criminal and terrorist events are occurring on an all too frequent basis. As if that were not bad enough, the tactics that are being utilized by the 'bad guys' would seem to continue to evolve at a pace faster than the defense measures designed to thwart them.
Additionally, traditional ROE's, which establish how police, security, or military personnel will respond to an emerging threat, are predicated on assessments of vulnerability and intent that may be flawed -- or not updated in a timely enough manner to be effective. In other words, recent asymmetric attacks are being designed to defeat conventional forces by interrupting or defeating their "Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action" (OODA) loop. (13)
Solutions??
It is unlikely that this article will be able to resolve all of the issues of a need for more effective and rapidly changing ROE's. That will be left to people far smarter than this author. But, in an effort to try to develop a "better system," we would respectfully suggest that the following items might be given consideration:
1. The "observation phase" of the OODA process could be dramatically improved by adding additional HUMINT (Human intelligence) and OSINT (Open Sources Intelligence) assets to assist in the determination of both vulnerabilities and threats.
2. The training of both military and police/security personnel must be updated to enable them to mentally assimilate a rapidly changing or deteriorating tactical situation, and then quickly adapt to the new environment. It should be noted that a failure to rapidly and appropriately adapt to changing tactical and strategic circumstances can lead to the unnecessary deaths of injuries of friendly forces.
3. The issue of "less-than-lethal" weapons and tactics for using them should be given additional consideration. By using new technologies, military/law enforcement personnel may be able to use alternative methods of force, which can accomplish the necessary objectives without the sometimes inherent negative consequences of the use of "deadly force."
4. In the opinion of this author, greater consideration must be given to the implications of "urban warfare," future conflicts fought in the cities of contested areas. Although they remain a possibility, "massed land battles" in largely unpopulated areas are probably not the scenarios that the U.S. military will face in the coming decade. It is far more likely that they will be confronted by "the battle of Mogadishu or Grozny," rather than the deserts of Iraq or the plains of Eastern Europe.
5. It should be recognized that almost regardless of the actions of military or law enforcement personnel, that careers may made or broken by the press and public perception of the correctness of any use of deadly force. It is believed that the lines between what is acceptable in "war" and that which can be undertaken in civil law enforcement or "peacekeeping" will continue to become increasingly blurred and more difficult to understand. The importance of comprehension, however, of the subtleties of these future conflicts can not be overstated.
This article is written to provoke both thought and comment. As always, the author welcomes both opposing and complimentary viewpoints. Feel free to send your comments, questions, or suggestions to the addresses listed below.
REFERENCES:
(1) "Series of EmergencyNet News "Real-Time" Reports Concerning an Explosion Aboard the U.S.S. Cole in the Port of Aden, Yemen -- 12 Oct to 14 Nov 2000," EmergencyNet News, 2000. Available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/2000/usscole-bomb.htm
(2) "Rules of Engagement," a movie by Paramount Pictures, Inc., Synopsis and "trailer" available on the internet at: http://www.rulesmovie.com/
(3) "Columbine Report: Table of Contents," ABCNews, 2000. Available on the internet at: http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/columbine/TOC.htm
(4) "THE EMERGENCE AND EMPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC ULTRAVIOLENCE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE," Denney, J. and Lee, D., 1997. Available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/stratvio.htm
(5) "Summary of Reports; LAPD Bank of America Shoot-Out-02/28/97", Staten, C. and Macko, S., EmergencyNet News Service, 1997. Available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/lapdbank.htm
(6) "FBI Crime Uniform Crime Report Statistics, 1999." Available on the internet at: http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/prelim99.pdf (requires Adobe .pdf reader software to view)
(7) "Summary of Selected EmergencyNet News Real-time Reports Concerning Mass Shootings-1996 to 1999," EmergencyNet News Service, 1999. Available on the internet at: http://www.emergency.com/1999/shootsum.htm
(8) "Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence," Security Research Center (SRC) for the Private Sector Liaison Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Available on the internet at: http://www.theiacp.org/pubinfo/pubs/pslc/svindex.htm
(9) Discussion Paper "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces (1 Oct 94), Unclassified. Available on the internet at: http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/96_6/roetoc.htm
(10) ibid, "SAMPLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT; RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (As Authorized by JCS [EUCOM Dir 55-47])," Somalia in 1992 and 1993. Available on the internet at: http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-23/fm100_10.htm
(11) "The Strategic Implications of Operational Law," LTC Geoffrey Demarest, Foreign Military Studies Office, April 1995. Available on the internet at: http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/oplaw.htm
(12) "Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective," Brigadier Gavin Bulloch (British Army, Ret.), From Parameters, Summer 1996, pp. 4-16, Available on-line at: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/96summer/bulloch.htm
(13) "Patterns of Conflict," and "Discourse on Wining and Losing," Colonel John Boyd, USAF, unpublished briefing dated August, 1987. Several explanations and examples of Col. Boyd's work are available on the internet at: http://www.belisarius.com/default.htm
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